Indiana Law Journal
Volume 86

Issue 4

Article 6

Fall 2011

Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of Family
Taxation
Dennis J. Ventry Jr
UC Davis School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ventry, Dennis J. Jr (2011) "Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of Family Taxation,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 86 : Iss. 4 , Article 6.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol86/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of
Family Taxation†
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1460
I. FAMILY TAXATION AND AVOIDANCE UNDER THE NASCENT FEDERAL INCOME
TAX...................................................................................................................... 1466
II. THE NATURE OF SPOUSES’ INTEREST IN MARITAL INCOME AND PROPERTY ... 1471
III. CO-OWNERSHIP AND THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW ..................................................................................................................... 1479
A. THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND CALIFORNIA TAX “EVADERS”........ 1481
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE ATTACK AGAINST THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY TAX
LOOPHOLE ........................................................................................................... 1484
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND FAMILY TAXATION: DEFINING OWNERSHIP ......... 1490
A. CONTROL, BENEFICIAL INTERESTS, ENJOYMENT, AND OTHER INDICIA OF
OWNERSHIP ................................................................................................ 1493
VI. POE V. SEABORN: OWNERSHIP UNDER STATE PROPERTY LAW GOVERNS
TAXABILITY ......................................................................................................... 1502
VII. FROM LODESTAR TO LEGAL FICTION ........................................................... 1507
A. POLITICS OF TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAXING THE FAMILY ...................... 1510
CONCLUSION: SEABORN, INCOME SPLITTING, AND TAXING MODERN FAMILIES .. 1518
One of the most famous Supreme Court tax cases celebrated its eightieth
birthday last year. In Poe v. Seaborn, the Court reified two principles of the federal
income tax: ownership determines tax liability and state law determines ownership.
This Article affirms that family taxation continues to follow ownership, not
marriage, despite the federal government’s position that the “ownership equals
taxability” rule applies almost exclusively to heterosexual spouses. Verifying the
vitality of this principle carries significant implications for all families, particularly
nontraditional families. Under the aegis of Seaborn, the principle authorizes
certain members of state-recognized relationships—marriages, domestic
partnerships, civil unions—to file federal income taxes based on ownership
interests under state law and to split combined income in half, an outcome largely
at odds with current treatment. Indeed, Seaborn provides legally recognized samesex couples a way around the tax filing restrictions and disadvantages imposed on
them by the Defense of Marriage Act, which does not consider them spouses under
federal law. Seaborn empowers these families to take advantage of tax savings
associated with income splitting.
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To prove that ownership of income and property, rather than marriage,
determines family tax liability, this Article traces the “ownership equals taxability”
principle from the late nineteenth century to after World War II; that is, from the
decades leading up to ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Seaborn and beyond. It is a story of the early federal
income tax, of tax avoidance opportunities for families, of the nature of spouses’
legal interests as defined by state property law, and of early tax enforcement efforts
by the Treasury Department and Congress. It is also a story of how the Supreme
Court protected Congress’s taxing power and the federal purse by articulating an
expansive definition of ownership for tax purposes, particularly in the context of
the family.
INTRODUCTION
Late last year, one of the most famous U.S. Supreme Court tax cases celebrated
its eightieth birthday. In Poe v. Seaborn, the Court reified two principles of the
federal income tax: ownership determines tax liability1 and state law determines
ownership.2 For eight decades, federal courts3 and the Internal Revenue

1. 282 U.S. 101, 109–10 (1930) (holding federal income tax assesses a levy “upon the
net income of every individual” and that “the word ‘of’ denotes ownership”).
2. Id. at 110 (explaining that, in determining ownership of income and property to be
taxed under the federal income tax, the “answer is found in the statutes of the State”).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (“[F]ederal income tax
liability follows ownership. In the determination of ownership, state law controls.”);
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1942) (“When Congress fixes a tax on the possibility
of . . . the distribution of income, the ‘necessary implication,’ we think, is that the possibility
is to be determined by the state law.”); Morgan v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940) (“[I]n the
application of a federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature of the legal
interest which the taxpayer had in the property or income sought to be reached by the
statute.”); Comm’r v. Dunkin, 500 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding ownership
determines taxability and state law determines ownership); Raymond v. United States, 355
F.3d 107, 112 n.8 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] married couple could ‘split’ income derived from
property co-owned by operation of law in a community property state.” (citing Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930))); United States v. Goodyear, 99 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1938)
(finding that taxability follows ownership, and California property law provides spouses
equal 50% interest in all marital income and property); Simmons v. Cullen, 197 F. Supp.
179, 181 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (arguing that “the incidence of the tax follows ownership of the
income” and ownership “is governed by local rather than Federal law” (citing Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930))); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 131 T.C. 215, 218 (2008) (stating that
“tax liability for income from property attaches to the owner of the property” and “[s]tate
law determines the nature of a property interest”); Dotson v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary
Opinion 2004-164, at 4–5 (2004) (noting that it is a “well-established principle that income
from property is taxed to the owner of the property” and asserting that “State law controls in
deciding . . . property interests”); Witcher v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (CCH) 2002-292, at 6 (2002)
(finding that “income from property is taxed to the owner of the property”); Westerdahl v.
Comm’r, 82 T.C. 83 (1984) (stating that federal income tax liability is based on ownership
under state property law); Bagur v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 817, 819 (1976) (stating that federal
income taxation follows ownership and “State law determines the ownership of income” to
be taxed); Bishop v. Comm’r, 4 T.C. 588, 592 (1945) (referring to the proposition from Poe
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Service4 have cited Seaborn’s “ownership equals taxability” holding, both with
respect to family income and other income as well.5 Its application is so extensive
that every April 15, tens of millions of taxpayers attest to their tax liability by
applying Seaborn whether they realize it or not.6
Despite Seaborn’s pervasiveness, the IRS ruled in 2006 that the “ownership
equals taxability” rule applies exclusively to married couples and, more pointedly,
to heterosexual married couples.7 In particular, the IRS refused to apply Seaborn to
registered domestic partners (RDPs) in California, even though that state’s property
law holds that RDPs “shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and
shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law . . .
as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.”8 The government’s primary argument
was that case law relating to Seaborn “has always arisen solely in the context of
spouses”9 and did not attach to other legally recognized relationships. Even though
domestic partners, like spouses, each owned one half of all community income
under California property law, unlike spouses, they could not each report one half
of the community income for purposes of filing federal income taxes. The
government’s argument was both false and unavailing. Courts had in fact applied
Seaborn in contexts outside of marriage.10 Equally important, even though Seaborn
involved the allocation of taxable income and property between two taxpayer
spouses, nothing in the Court’s decision limited its application to husbands and
wives.
In 2010, the IRS revised its position,11 but once more missed the mark. In
response to a request for guidance from a California taxpayer, the IRS ruled that the
taxpayer and his domestic partner “must report one-half of the community
income.”12 In so doing, the government applied Seaborn’s “ownership equals
taxability” principle to RDPs for the first time. But its reasoning was flawed, as it
was grounded in a 2006 change to California’s domestic partnership law that had
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), that “ownership is the test of taxability” and finding that
state property law determines ownership).
4. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849; I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B.
371; Rev. Rul. 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 20; Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 C.B. 10; Rev. Rul. 63-168,
1963-2 C.B. 9; Rev. Rul. 55-597, 1955-2 C.B. 15; see also IRM § 25.18.1.1 (Feb. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-018-001.html (“Federal law determines
how property is taxed, but state law determines whether, and to what extent, a taxpayer has
‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ subject to taxation.”).
5. Mitchell, 403 U.S. at 197.
6. For married couples, the administrative convenience of joint filing, 26 U.S.C.
§ 1(a)(1) (2006), which assumes equal ownership of marital income and property, may
obscure Seaborn’s salience, but it does not nullify its application.
7. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200608038 (Feb. 24, 2006).
8. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).
9. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200608038, supra note 7, at 3.
10. See, e.g., Hogan v. United States, No. 85-0041, 1985 WL 6395 (D. Me. 1985)
(involving tax treatment of earnings of a Jesuit priest who had taken a vow of poverty);
Teschner v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962) (involving allocation of income from contest
winnings between father and daughter); see also infra Parts V.A.1–2 examining cases
involving trusts and assignments.
11. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050 (May 5, 2010).
12. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

1462

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1459

prohibited RDPs from treating earned income as community property for state
income tax purposes.13 The earlier prohibition never affected the shared, vested,
and equal ownership interests of RDPs in all community income and property. Nor
did repealing the prohibition suddenly grant such interests to RDPs under the
state’s community property law. Each member of a domestic partnership in
California owned one-half the community’s income and property both before and
after the 2006 amendment regardless of its characterization on state tax returns.
State tax law is largely irrelevant for purposes of determining federal income tax
liability.14
Instead, as this Article demonstrates, ownership of income and property is the
lodestar of family taxation under the federal income tax. California community
property law grants equal ownership to domestic partners and opposite-sex spouses
in precisely the same way. Similarly, equal ownership attaches to domestic partners
in the community property states of Nevada and Washington.15 More generally,
equal ownership can attach to income and property of couples resident in any state
with legally recognized domestic relationships so long as the state provides distinct
ownership interests within those relationships by operation of general property
law.16 Seaborn treats all these couples equally, allocating federal tax liability within
the family by ownership interest under state property law. If the interests are equal,
Seaborn further authorizes the couple to split combined income in half when
reporting federal income taxes.
***
As already noted, this Article establishes that taxability follows ownership, not
marriage. Verifying the broad application of this principle carries significant
implications for taxpayers and taxpaying families nationwide. Most immediately, it
would affect the vast majority of the 581,300 same-sex couples that the federal tax

13. For the enacted law, see S.B. 1827, 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2006). For the repealed
provision, see former CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).
14. Law professor Patricia Cain makes this point in commenting on the 2010 IRS
guidance: “States like Washington and Texas [both community property states] do not tax
the income of their residents. The IRS would never accept an argument that because state
law treats income as a non-taxable item, the federal law should do the same.” Patricia Cain,
Same-Sex Couples in Community Property States, SAME SEX TAX L. BLOG (Nov. 23, 2010,
7:23 PM), http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/same-sex-couples-in-community-propertystates.cfm. For more discussion of the 2010 ruling, see infra notes 477–96 and
accompanying text.
15. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.010–.510 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.60.010–.901 (West 2007). The IRS recognized this reality subsequent to its 2010 ruling
pertaining to California. See I.R.S., TAX GUIDE 2010: YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX FOR
INDIVIDUALS, Publication 17, at 5, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf
(stating that registered domestic partners in California, Nevada, and Washington “must
report half the combined community income earned by the individual and his or her
domestic partner”); I.R.S., 1040EZ INSTRUCTIONS 2010, at 10 (2010) (extending treatment to
same-sex spouses in California as well); infra notes 497–501 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 502–07 and accompanying text.
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system does not currently recognize as constituting family units,17 as well as the 8.8
million remaining members of the gay, lesbian, and bisexual population who may
also form committed relationships.18 These families, many of which are recognized
under state law as possessing rights similar or equivalent to opposite-sex married
couples,19 are prohibited from filing joint tax returns like traditional spouses, a
prohibition that creates undue complexities, including the application of differential
tax rates, conflicting state and federal tax rules for the same transaction or form of
income, and expensive tax planning designed to formalize rights and obligations
that occur naturally for married taxpayers (such as rights of survivorship).
Applying the “ownership equals taxability” principle universally under the federal
income tax could also affect the 6.7 million opposite-sex couples currently living
with partners outside of marriage20 and the remaining single population in
committed relationships.
This Article contributes to the vigorous and increasingly salient debate over how
to tax traditional and nontraditional families.21 Its conclusions implicate all forms

17. Press Release, The Williams Institute, New Census Bureau Data Show Annual
Increases in Same-Sex Couples Outpacing Population Growth; Same-Sex Couples Affected
by Recession (Oct. 4, 2010). This figure represents a 3% jump from 2008, when the Census
Bureau estimated 565,000 same-sex couples. See GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INST.,
SAME-SEX SPOUSES AND UNMARRIED PARTNERS IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY,
2008, at 2 (2009). The actual number of same-sex spouses is probably even larger according
to researchers. Indeed, approximately one in seven same-sex couples are not identified as
such by current Census Bureau data collections methods. See GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS
INST., SAME-SEX COUPLES IN U.S. CENSUS BUREAU DATA: WHO GETS COUNTED AND WHY 3
(2010).
18. GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN,
BISEXUAL POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 4
(2006).
19. These families include members of same-sex marriages, domestic partnerships, civil
unions, and other legal relationships formalized by a state. See infra notes 498–516 and
accompanying text.
20. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports Families with Children
Increasingly
Face
Unemployment
(Jan.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/families_households/cb10-08.html.
21. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code,
34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000); Patricia A. Cain, Relitigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community
Income of California Registered Domestic Partners, 111 TAX NOTES 561 (2006); Patricia A.
Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (2008) [hereinafter Cain, Taxing
Families Fairly]; Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD.
471 (1997); Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage
and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757 (2004); Anthony C. Infanti,
Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing in the United States,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 605; Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System:
Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407
(2008); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191 (2008); Anthony C. Infanti,
The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004); Lily
Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 651 (2010); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at
Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993); Shari Motro, A New
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of legally formalized relationships, however, personal as well as business. For
purposes of focusing the discussion, this Article applies the “ownership equals
taxability” principle exclusively to the family setting.
Proving that ownership of income and property rather than marriage determines
family tax liability requires a historical examination. Notwithstanding Seaborn’s
importance in establishing one of the bedrock principles of the federal income tax,
we know next to nothing of the historical and jurisprudential developments that
culminated in the decision. This Article remedies that deficiency. It traces the
“ownership equals taxability” principle from the late nineteenth century to 1930—
that is, from the decades leading up to ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Seaborn. It is a story of the early
federal income tax, of tax avoidance opportunities for families, of the nature of
spouses’ legal interests as defined by state property laws, and of early tax
enforcement efforts by the Treasury Department and Congress. It is also a story of
how the Supreme Court protected Congress’s taxing power and the federal purse by
articulating an expansive definition of ownership for tax purposes that relied on
indicia of ownership such as control, management, dominion, beneficial and
equitable interests, and enjoyment of rights constituent of ownership.
Seaborn illuminates these legal, political, and sociological storylines. But its
legacy is as important to this Article as the events leading up to the Court’s
decision. In the aftermath of Seaborn, the Court continued to articulate an
expansive definition of ownership and income to curb taxpayers’ insatiable appetite
for tax avoidance. In its most well-known trust case, the Court wrote, “Technical
considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal
paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a refuge from surtaxes
should not obscure the basic issue,” which in the case at hand involved artificially
shifting income within the family unit.22 But while the Court scrutinized private
law for contrivances (including instruments such as trusts, contracts, assignments,
and gifts), it respected, without exception, how states’ general law allocated
ownership interests within families (both with respect to community property and
common law regimes).23 It even looked the other way when Congress enacted the
income-splitting joint return in 1948—an administrative device that treated all
spouses’ income and property as owned “fifty-fifty” for federal tax purposes—

“I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006); Theodore
P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529
(2008); Keeva Terry, Separate and Still Unequal?: Taxing California Registered Domestic
Partners, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 633 (2008).
22. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
23. As this Article demonstrates, the distinction between private law and general law
animated the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in family taxation. In particular, the Court saw
tax avoidance and artificiality behind “voluntary” or “consensual” private law arrangements
that reduced tax liability, while it attached legitimacy to “involuntary” and “legal” general
property law regimes that applied uniformly and without an eye toward tax reduction. See
Comm’r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 46–48 (1944) (invalidating Oklahoma’s optional
community property law on grounds that it created a “consensual” rather than a “legal”
community, enacted solely for federal tax purposes).
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because the legal fiction of income splitting did not disturb ownership interests as
defined by state property law.24
Eighty years after Seaborn and sixty years after passage of the income-splitting
provision, ownership of income and property remains the guidepost of family
taxation. Indeed, taxability follows ownership defined by state property law and not
the presence or absence of a marriage license. This Article removes the false
barometer of marriage between a man and woman as the basis of family taxation
and reestablishes ownership principles grounded in longstanding Supreme Court
jurisprudence as the historically and legally accurate gauge for taxing families. In
so doing, it argues that Seaborn authorizes members of all state-recognized
families—marriage, common law marriage, domestic partnership, civil union—to
file federal income taxes according to ownership interests as determined by state
law. For those legally recognized families currently prohibited from filing joint
returns—particularly those restricted by virtue of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which prohibits same-sex couples from being treated as spouses under
federal law25—Seaborn entitles them to file two federal tax returns each reflecting
one-half total family income.

24. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Save State Residents: States’ Use of Community
Property for Federal Tax Reduction, 1939–1947, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 585, 621–22 (2009)
(stating that the split-income provision “did not affect state-defined property rights in any
way” but merely extended to all married couples “the benefit of income splitting without
having to divide the ownership of family property between spouses”).
25. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of
the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife.”). On February 23, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice
announced that the Obama Administration was taking the position that Section 3 of DOMA
as applied to same-sex couples legally married under state law violated the equal protection
clause of the Fifth Amendment and thus was unconstitutional. As a result, the U.S. Attorney
General directed the Department of Justice to stop defending Section 3 of the statute. See
Letter from Eric Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives
(Feb.
23,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The policy change with
respect to defending DOMA does not mean that same-sex taxpayers in legally recognized
relationships are now treated the same as opposite-sex couples for purposes of the federal
income tax. Indeed, it could take years before we understand the full extent of the Attorney
General’s directive (specifically, until cases challenging Section 3 navigate through the
courts). And even if the government is not willing to defend DOMA, individual members of
Congress have indicated they intend to defend the law in court in place of the Department of
Justice. See Frank James & Liz Halloran, Boehner: House Will Defend DOMA; Courts, not
(Mar.
4,
2011,
3:52
PM),
Obama,
Should
Decide,
NPR.ORG
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/03/04/134268656/boehner-house-will-defenddoma-courts-not-obama-should-decide.
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I. FAMILY TAXATION AND AVOIDANCE UNDER THE NASCENT
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
The modern federal income tax was born in 1913 after three-quarters of the
states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment.26 Within months of ratification, Congress
enacted an income tax law that was modest by any standard. The new levy assessed
a “normal” tax of 1% on incomes above $3000 for single individuals and $4000 for
married couples as well as a progressive “surtax” ranging from 1% to 6% on
incomes above $20,000.27 All taxpayers—single, married, with or without
dependents—were subject to the same rate schedule.28 As its Progressive Era
advocates had envisioned,29 the tax fell disproportionately on the rich. Adjusted for
inflation, the exemption levels created a tax-free threshold for singles and married
couples, respectively, of $67,000 and $90,000.30 Meanwhile, only taxpayers with
incomes exceeding $445,000 (adjusted) were subject to the surtax rates, with the
top marginal rate only affecting incomes above $11 million (adjusted).31 The classbased federal income tax with its generous zero-bracket levels exempted 98% of all
households.32
Under the 1913 statute, married taxpayers could file separate or joint returns at
their discretion. Families in which one spouse earned all the taxable income filed

26. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 36–
46 (1996).
27. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–68. The flat “normal” tax rate was
assessed on taxable income above exemption levels and below an income ceiling of $20,000,
while the graduated “surtax” rates were assessed on all taxable income above the ceiling. Id.
28. By comparison, since 1969, the federal income tax has contained four different rate
schedules for individual taxpayers: married individuals filing joint returns and surviving
spouses; heads of households; single individuals; and married individuals filing separate
returns. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
29. See generally CORDELL HULL, 1 THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 71 (1948)
(primary author of the 1913 Revenue Act calling income tax “the one great equalizer of the
tax burden and therefore a tremendous agency for the improvement of social conditions”);
ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX, 1861–1913 (1993) (arguing wealthy Americans and business groups supported
the progressive income tax to stave off more radical calls for industrial democracy); Ajay K.
Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and
the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005)
(exploring historical shifts in legal and economic thought among academic economists that
justified redistributive, ability to pay taxation); Ajay K. Mehrotra, “Render Unto
Caesar . . .”: Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and the Historical Underpinnings of the Modern
American Tax System, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 328–33, 345–65 (2009) (examining role of
“ethical political economists” in the religious and social justice foundations of the federal
income tax).
30. All inflation-adjusted figures are derived from the “CPI Calculator” maintained by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
31. The top marginal rate of 7% began at $500,000, unadjusted. Supra note 27.
32. W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in
DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 29, 41–42 (Joel B.
Slemrod ed., 2000).
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joint returns, while families with two earners filed either jointly or separately.
Separate filing produced tax benefits because the statute allocated a higher
exemption to spouses remitting taxes on separate returns versus joint returns. When
filing separately, each spouse was allowed one personal exemption of $3000, while
one of the spouses received an additional $1000 exemption reserved for married
taxpayers, resulting in a total exemption of $7000.33 If the spouses aggregated
family income on a single return, the statute only exempted $4000 from income.34
Thus, if a couple’s income exceeded $4000, it paid higher taxes based simply on
whether they filed separately or jointly.
The potential tax saving associated with filing separately remained small in the
early years of the federal income tax due to low tax rates. The additional $3000
exemption for couples filing separately saved taxpayers with $7000 in taxable
income just $30 because the extra $3000 in income would otherwise be subject to a
tax rate of only 1%. Even taxpayers at the highest income levels, subject to the top
marginal rate of 7%, paid just $210 more on $3000 of income if they filed jointly
rather than separately. And since these taxpayers would have to report exceedingly
high incomes ($500,000 unadjusted, $11 million adjusted) to be subject to the full
$210 “penalty,” it was unlikely that filing jointly would motivate them to seek tax
avoidance devices.
The number of separate returns comprised only a fraction of all returns among
married taxpayers in the early years of the income tax. In 1919, only 58,500
spouses out of 2.9 million married taxpayers (i.e., 2%) filed separate returns.35 This
figure is significantly lower than the number of married couples statistically
eligible to file separately. In 1920, 9% of wives participated in the paid labor
force,36 a participation rate that economic historians recognize as significantly
under-representing the number of working women.37 Even white married women,
the female cohort with the highest levels of family income and the most to gain
from separate filing, achieved a participation rate of 6.5%.38
The low number of separate filers relative to the percentage of families with two
incomes may have reflected taxpayers’ confusion over the new income tax. We
know that the government had yet to work out the kinks in applying separate versus
joint filing. In a study on the early years of the federal income tax, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), predecessor to the Internal Revenue Service,
acknowledged that it struggled with “the baffling problem of whether the income of
husbands and wives living together should be viewed as a unit or as separate

33. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 168.
34. Id.
35. Miss Coyle, Joint Returns of Income of Husbands and Wives (Apr. 15, 1941) (on file
in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Record Group 56, Box
54), available at http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/marriage /hst28695/286957.htm.
36. Claudia Goldin, The Gender Gap in Historical Perspective, in QUANTITY &
QUIDDITY: ESSAYS IN U.S. ECONOMIC HISTORY 135, 142 (Peter Kilby ed., 1987).
37. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF AMERICAN WOMEN 43–46 (1990) (identifying biases in early Census procedures
dampening reported female labor force participation).
38. Goldin, supra note 36, at 142.
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incomes regardless of whether they chose to make joint or separate returns.”39
Levying surtaxes created special confusion. If a married couple filed a joint return,
the BIR almost always accepted the couple’s reporting position and assessed
graduated surtaxes on aggregate family income.40 If a couple filed separate returns,
however, the agency often rejected the couple’s reporting position, and assessed
surtaxes on aggregate income as if the couple had filed jointly in the first place. The
policy “did not seem to derive from any clear conception” of how to tax married
versus single taxpayers, but simply because it was “more convenient in some
instances.”41 Taxpayers, too, may have preferred filing jointly rather than
separately for the convenience.42 So long as rates remained low and exemptions
high, there was little economic incentive to divide income on separate returns.
World War I changed everything. The Wilson administration relied heavily on
the income tax to prosecute the war.43 In the process, it made paying taxes
considerably more painful for wealthy Americans. The Revenue Act of 1916 more
than doubled existing rates, raising the top marginal rate from 7% to 15%,44 while
preserving the personal exemption levels.45 The statute also provided a graduated

39. Louis Shere, Tax Revision 1937—Project No. 3, Miscellaneous and Administrative
Tax Changes, 4–5 (Nov. 19, 1937) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/36.1).
40. But see infra note 42.
41. Shere, supra note 39. The policy seemed to conflict with official Treasury guidance.
See T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 268 (1914) (instructing revenue agents to
aggregate income “for the purpose of the normal tax only. The additional, or surtax, imposed
by the act will be computed on the basis of the separate income of each individual.”
(emphasis in original)); see also T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 48, 49 (1915).
42. For this reason, the BIR attempted to glean married taxpayers’ intent when
examining joint returns. The Treasury instructed its revenue agents:
Where husband and wife clearly indicate on a single return form the net income
of each, such a return does not necessarily constitute a joint return. It is a matter
of intent. Having separated their respective incomes, in the absence of a
showing to the contrary the presumption is that they intended to file separate
returns of income, but that for convenience they have used one form. In such
case both the normal and surtax should be computed on the separate income of
each. This presumption is, however, overcome if the tax has been computed by
the taxpayer on the combined net income; in which case, even though their
incomes have been separated and can be identified, the return is held to be a
joint return, and both the normal and surtax should be assessed on the basis of
combined net income.
O.D. 960, 4 C.B. 255 (1921); see also O.D. 881, 4 C.B. 254 (1921) (allocating wartime
excess profits tax exemption between spouses); O.D. 909, 4 C.B. 254 (1921) (allocating
deductions between spouses in community property states versus common law states); T.D.
3110, 4 C.B. 255 (1921) (allocating income of minor children).
43. For the federal income tax during World War I, see W. Elliot Brownlee, Economists
and the Formation of the Modern Tax System in the United States: The World War I Crisis,
in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE: THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH EXPERIENCES 401,
406–07 (Mary O. Furner & Barry Supple eds., 1990).
44. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 756–57.
45. Id. at 761.
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tax on estates exceeding $50,000 ($1 million adjusted) with a top rate of 10% on
estates above $5,000,00046 ($100 million adjusted).
High-income taxpayers charged the Wilson administration with pursuing a
“soak-the-rich” program.47 They were right. In 1917, Congress gave the
administration what it wanted, raising rates across the board, more than
quadrupling the top marginal rate from 15% to 67%, and exposing lower levels of
income to significantly higher taxes.48 In addition, it reduced personal exemption
levels for individuals as well as married taxpayers,49 creating more than 100,000
new income taxpayers. Despite lower exemptions, the levy remained a class-based
tax, affecting only 15% of all households.50 The richest 1% of Americans,
moreover, accounted for 80% of federal income tax receipts in 1918 and were
subject to effective tax rates (i.e., including exemptions and deductions) exceeding
15%, up from 3% in 1916.51 The Revenue Act of 1918 raised rates again, such that
by war’s end, personal income tax rates ranged between 12% and 77%,52 while
estate tax rates reached 25%.53
In five short years, the income tax was transformed from a “rather tentative”
revenue instrument into “the foremost instrument of federal taxation.”54 It went
from imposing a modest 1% tax of $200 on taxable income of $20,000 to
subjecting that income to ten different tax rates, ranging from 12% to 21%, for a
total tax of $3,300, a jump of more than 1,600%.55 Increases at higher income
levels were equally staggering. On $100,000 of income, a taxpayer paid $2,500 in
1915 and $36,500 in 1918, while at $1,000,000, he paid $60,050 in 1915 and
$704,530 in 1918.56
Very quickly, taxpayers faced significant economic incentives to seek tax
avoidance. Some of the early techniques included gifts of income and property
(during both life and at death), joint ownership of property, assignments of income
and property, family partnerships, and a multiplying array of trusts. For taxpaying
husbands and wives, opportunities to shift taxable income and property within the
family unit abounded, and increased exponentially in the presence of children. The
simple act of filing separately rather than jointly could produce significant tax
savings. In 1918, a husband and wife with $100,000 of taxable income filing two
separate returns of $50,000 paid $12,000 on each return for a total tax bill of

46. Id. at 777–80.
47. The term “soak-the-rich” taxation was used widely in the United States to describe
progressive taxation. See Brownlee, supra note 32, at 44 n. 27.
48. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 300–01.
49. Id. at 301.
50. Brownlee, supra note 32, at 44.
51. Id. These figures do not account for the incidence of the corporate income tax,
which would raise effective rates.
52. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062–64.
53. Id. at 1096–97.
54. Brownlee, supra note 32, at 44.
55. Between 1913 and 1915, the first $20,000 of taxable income was subject to a single
rate of 1%. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166; Revenue Act of 1918, 40
Stat. at 1062–64.
56. Calculated using sources cited supra note 55.
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$24,000. If the same couple filed jointly, it owed $36,500 with the last $50,000 of
income subject to marginal rates ranging from 36% to 64%, resulting in a tax
penalty of $12,500 and a tax bill more than 50% higher. The discrepancy was even
greater if the couple could split its income not just twice, but three, four, or six
times by also shifting income to other family members.
Tax authorities and policy makers were acutely aware of these opportunities,
and began to track and quantify the tax avoidance. “Taxpayers on large incomes
and businesses are finding a hundred different methods of legally reducing their
obligations to the Government,” Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon reported.57
Wartime surtaxes had “greatly stimulated avoidance, not to say, evasion of the tax,”
concluded economist Thomas Adams, chair of the Treasury’s Tax Advisory
Board.58 “Revenues have been falling off, particularly the collections from richer
taxpayers.”59 In fact, Adams found that taxpayers with incomes over $100,000
reported net income of $1.6 billion in 1917, but only $600 million in 1920.60 Part of
the falloff was due to reductions in rates and increases in the personal and
dependency exemptions.61 But most of the reduction was attributable to highincome taxpayers incorporating personal property, disposing of income and
property through gifts, and shifting investments from taxable to tax-free securities.
Adams was particularly critical of tax avoidance through gifting. He railed that
“rich men have recently divided their property by gift, conveying it usually to
members of the family and so dividing the former income into several parts.”62
Adams likened the harmful practice of gifting among family members to
married couples in community property states who divided family income in half
on two separate tax returns. “Practically the same result,” Adams noted, “is reached
in a number of southern and western states by the community-property laws which
bring about a division of the ordinary family income.”63 Both practices were “major
evils” that the government could remedy “rather easily.”64 “Gifts could be made
subject to the income or estate tax,”65 and Congress could tax the donor at the time
of transfer on appreciated property or require the donee to assume the donor’s
basis.66 With respect to the “community-property problem,” Congress could
prohibit separate filing and require all married couples to combine family income
for tax purposes.67 Adams commented favorably on the Wisconsin state income tax
statute, which required husbands and wives to aggregate taxable income and

57. 65 CONG. REC. 8095 (1924) (statement of Sen. Walsh, quoting Treasury Secretary
Mellon).
58. Thomas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q. J.
ECON. 527, 528 (1921).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 233, 243.
62. Adams, supra note 58, at 533.
63. Id. at 533–34.
64. Id. at 534.
65. Id. at 534. In 1924, Congress enacted a gift tax to curb avoidance through inter vivos
transfers. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 313–16 (1924).
66. Adams, supra note 58, at 534.
67. Id.
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property on a joint return.68 He recommended that Congress take “action along
these lines,”69 a position also advocated by Secretary Mellon.70 Permitting spouses
in community property states to file separate returns reflecting half the family
income represented one of the “deeper defects”71 of the income tax and threatened
the levy’s revenue capacity.
As part of its crackdown on family tax avoidance, the Treasury persuaded
Congress to revise the personal exemptions by allocating a single exemption to
husbands and wives whether filing jointly or separately. Under prior law, spouses
filing jointly took the exemption for married couples, while husbands and wives
filing separately were allowed one exemption for married couples and another for
single individuals. Beginning in 1918, spouses were allocated the same total
exemption no matter how they filed.72
The most lucrative tax avoidance opportunities remained available to married
couples despite Treasury’s best efforts. Husbands and wives could avoid the sting
of steeply progressive rates by dividing family income on separate returns. They
accomplished income shifting in a variety of ways, including through gifts of
income and property, family trusts, joint ownership of property, assignments of
income and property, and family partnerships. Married couples living in a minority
of states enjoyed additional income-splitting opportunities by virtue of their
property law regimes. The eight states that operated under community property law
treated income and property acquired during marriage as presumptively owned
equally between husband and wife.73 Thus, under general property law precepts,
marital income and property was already split in half such that, for purposes of
reporting federal tax liability, a community property married couple could file two
separate returns each reflecting exactly half the family’s taxable income. If the
Treasury Department wanted to eliminate this form of tax saving, it would have to
abolish separate returns and require compulsory joint filing. In so doing, it would
have to challenge determinations of property ownership and the nature of spouses’
interests in marital partnerships, a determination that had traditionally been the
exclusive province of state governments.
II. THE NATURE OF SPOUSES’ INTEREST IN MARITAL INCOME AND PROPERTY
Under traditional common law, marriage resulted in a unified rather than a
shared property interest with nearly all incidents of ownership and control located
in the husband. The reality was not far from Blackstone’s aphorism that the act of
marriage consolidated the spouses’ otherwise individual interests into a single
unity—the husband.74 Upon marriage, a wife’s personalty merged with that of her

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See infra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
71. Adams, supra note 58, at 528.
72. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 301.
73. The eight states included Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Texas, and Washington. The other forty states operated under common law. Alaska
and Hawaii would not become states until 1959.
74. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’
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husband such that all her personal property—including clothes, jewelry, furniture—
were owned by her spouse, whose power over them was absolute. He could literally
sell the clothes off her back. And while she did not necessarily lose rights in her
real property upon marriage, a married woman lost the ability to manage and
control her realty. Her list of disabilities under the common law was long: she
could neither enter into nor enforce a contract, neither file lawsuits nor be sued in
her own name, and she was prohibited from executing wills, holding property in
her name, controlling her earnings (both in market and home production), or
enjoying any rights in income, crops, or manufactured goods flowing from her
realty. And although some early colonial statutes extended rights to married
women, none of them seriously challenged traditional marital status under
coverture.75
Over the course of the nineteenth century, traditional common law underwent a
revolution. Beginning in the 1830s, states adopted married women’s property
statutes that chipped away at common law marital precepts by providing wives
legal rights independent of husbands.76 The first wave of statutes protected certain
kinds of property that married women brought into marriage from their husbands
and their husband’s creditors.77 Later statutes granted married women additional
Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994) (“By marriage, the husband
and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.” (emphasis in
original) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442)).
75. See, e.g., NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 15–112 (1979); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER,
AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 80–124 (1991); ELIZABETH BOWLES
WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800–1861, at 1–136
(1987); Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law, 1800–1850, 71 GEO. L.J.
1359, 1384–97 (1983).
76. Most scholars identify Mississippi as the first state to enact a married woman’s
property act. The statute provided wives limited property rights, largely in connection with
protecting from her husband’s creditors any slaves she brought into marriage. See Sandra
Moncrief, The Mississippi Married Women’s Property Act of 1839, 47 J. MISS. HIST. 110
(1985). Four years before enactment of the Mississippi statute, the territorial legislature in
Arkansas adopted a law protecting a wife’s property from her husband’s debts. See
WARBASSE, supra note 75, at 159; Chused, supra note 75, at 1399.
77. See, e.g., PEGGY A. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FEMALE EMANCIPATION (1980) (finding statutory changes in women’s legal status were
motivated by fathers’ desire to protect their daughters’ inheritance from husbands and
husbands’ creditors); WARBASSE, supra note 75, at 160 (concluding “legislators appear to
have been primarily concerned with keeping the wife’s property from being taken for the
husband’s debts” and “were really seeking to protect planters from financial disaster as much
as to defend married women’s rights”); Linda E. Speth, The Married Women’s Property
Acts, 1839–1865: Reform, Reaction, or Revolution?, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69, 74 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982) (“By leaving the husband
with the common-law right of management and control of his wife’s property, yet preventing
that property from being seized for his debts, the early married women’s property acts left
the husband in a better position to withstand the hazards of the nineteenth-century
economy.”); Chused, supra note 75, at 1361, 1400–04 (arguing economic panic of the 1830s
prompted “legislatures to codify a portion of the equitable separate estate tradition by
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separate ownership interests in property, such as the ability to manage and control
personal and real property acquired prior to marriage and by gift, inheritance, or
bequest; to enjoy the profits from that property; to will, sell, or otherwise convey
property to third parties; to control their own wages; to establish separate estates;
and to have access to their deceased husband’s personal property.78 Scholars have
shown that the statutory changes neither “fully emancipate[d] wives from the
common law of marital status”79 nor reified legal patriarchy.80 The truth lies
somewhere in between. Given prevailing gender norms, statutory reforms to
traditional common law never embraced equality between the sexes or shared
ownership principles.81 Instead, they granted married women limited legal rights to
separate property and earnings that may have hardened rather than softened

insulating wives’ property from their spouses’ creditors”). Contra Carole Shammas, ReAssessing the Married Women’s Property Acts, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 9, 24 (1994) (“In all the
acts, pre-1848 and post, the common concern was for the fate of the woman’s patrimony, not
for male bankrupts.”).
78. See, e.g., HOFF, supra note 75, at 117–35 (Hoff outlines six phases of women’s
property law reform on page 128.); B. Zorina Kahn, Married Women’s Property Laws and
Female Commercial Activity: Evidence from United States Patent Records, 1790–1895, 56 J.
ECON. HIST. 356, 360–65 (1996) (identifying three waves of women’s property law reform).
79. Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’
Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127, 2127 (1994); see also BASCH, supra note
75, at 4 (concluding that “[f]ull legal equality for married women loomed as a threat to the
entire economic structure”); Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s
Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and
Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 5 (1985) (reporting a “loss of special status for
property owned by married women” in Oregon (emphasis in original)); Chused, supra note
75, at 1361–62 (concluding married women’s acts “did not legitimate any radical shifts in
the economic status of women” and “confirmed rather than confronted prevailing domestic
roles of married women”); Michael Dougan, The Arkansas Married Women’s Property Law,
46 ARK. HIST. Q. 3 (1987) (finding restrictive judicial interpretation of married women’s
property laws in Arkansas); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of
Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988) (examining limitations of
later earnings statutes on women’s claim to wages); Sara L. Zeigler, Uniformity and
Conformity: Regionalism and the Adjudication of the Married Women’s Property Acts, 28
POLITY 467, 469–70 (1996) (finding “judicial intransigence” and strict common law
principles “guaranteed the ancient protections and disabilities of wives and limited the
legislatures’ ability to remove those disabilities and protections”).
80. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 78 (finding statutes encouraged wives’
entrepreneurialism as measured by the filing of federal patents); Shammas, supra note 77, at
15, 23 (“When viewed from the perspective of the early American period . . . the acts appear
to be a more important turning point in female status” and paved the way for women “to
make some decisions about their and their family’s own consumption, investments, and
wealth transmission.”).
81. See Donna C. Schuele, Community Property Law and the Politics of Married
Women’s Rights in Nineteenth-Century California, 7 WEST. L. HIST. 245, 266 (1994) (under
reformed common law “any discussion of equal treatment had to proceed from that system’s
gendered, individualistic notions”); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s
Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1116
(1994) (describing failed efforts to “empower[] economically productive women to
participate equally with men in managing assets both had helped to accumulate”).
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traditional gender roles, with the wife responsible for home production and the
husband responsible for market production.82
While reformed common law emphasized spouses’ separate interests,
community property law presumed shared interests in common property.83
Community property law in the United States was patterned primarily off the
Spanish system of marital property84 and recognized both common and separate
property.85 All property acquired during marriage (unless acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent) was presumptively common property and was shared equally by
husband and wife regardless of which spouse “earned” the property in the
traditional market sense. Indeed, according to commentators at the time, “[t]he
single common element” present in all community property statutes “is the notion
of co-ownership, and it is submitted that husband and wife may best be considered
as co-owners of the community property and as such to have ‘equal’ interests
therein.”86 All “proprietary interests of the spouses are not merely united but
unified; not mixed or blent, but identical.”87 Under community property law,
“dependence of the wife” gave way to “conjugal interdependence.”88
During marriage, the husband acted as manager of the common property for the
benefit of the community.89 His management powers, however, did not entitle him
to a larger share of the marital partnership, and the nonmanaging wife had the right
to disturb her husband’s management in the event he shirked his obligations to the

82. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 79, at 2131 (describing how the “movement for
egalitarian law reform . . . work[ed] to modernize and so naturalize an antiquated body of
status law”).
83. See, e.g., WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971); WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1975). Traditional common law shared with
community property law an emphasis on unity of interest. But while the unity under
traditional common law was contained within the husband, the unity under civil law was
shared under the marital partnership in which each spouse possessed equal property interests.
See, e.g., Susan Westerberg Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in
California’s Community Property System, 1849–1975, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1976).
84. The only potential outlier is Louisiana. Scholars debate the origins of Louisiana
community property law and whether it originated from French or Spanish law. See, e.g.,
Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present
Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971); Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A
Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972). While Louisiana property law
contains elements of both systems, its most salient provisions derive from Spanish law. See,
e.g., HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 6
(1945).
85. For Spanish civil law, see DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 83, at 126–29;
RICHARD A. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE,
UNDER THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM § 5 (1895).
86. M.R. Kirkwood, The Ownership of Community Property in California, 7 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 16 (1933).
87. Alvin E. Evans, The Ownership of Community Property, 35 HARV. L. REV. 47, 65
(1921) (emphasis omitted).
88. Id. at 67.
89. See infra notes 103–12 and accompanying text.
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community.90 Spouses managed their own separate property during marriage, not
because of any influence of common law ownership principles, but because
separate property was deemed to be acquired by “lucrative” sources of gratuitous
transfer rather than through “onerous” activity for the benefit of the community.91
Though co-ownership undergirded community property law in the United
States, the eight community property regimes reflected variations of shared
ownership. In particular, each state differed in important respects as to the nature of
the wife’s interest in common property.
Washington practiced the purest form of community property, reflecting strong
partnership and equality principles.92 The husband and wife formed a single entity
under Washington law,93 and the entity (rather than one or both spouses) owned all
community property in which husband and wife enjoyed equal rights and
interests.94 The Washington statute made the husband the managing agent of the
marital entity, but his absolute power of disposition over the entity’s property did
not create in him a larger ownership share.95
In Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and New Mexico, the community property statutes
emphasized equality of interests between spouses rather than the partnership model.
Instead of the marital entity owning common property, husband and wife owned an
undivided, indivisible, vested one-half of the community as individuals. It did not
matter which spouse held record title in the property.96 Thus, upon the death of
either spouse, the surviving member of the community took one-half of community
income and property by right of survivorship rather than by right of succession and

90. See infra notes 103–12 and accompanying text; see also Evans, supra note 87, at 65
(“Management and disposition may be vested in one or both, but that does not affect the
proprietary interests.”); Kirkwood, supra note 86, at 16 (stating that “the superior powers of
management vested in the husband are to be looked upon . . . as held by him in a
representative, rather than a proprietary, capacity”).
91. See DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 83, at 126–29; REPPY & DE FUNIAK, supra
note 83, at 129.
92. See, e.g., Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 P. 841, 841–42 (Wash. 1882) (describing the “legal
community” of husband and wife as “a partnership, in that some property coming from or
through one or other or both of the individuals forms for both a common stock, which bears
the losses and receives the profits of its management, and which is liable for individual
debts” (emphasis omitted in first quotation)).
93. See, e.g., Ostheller v. Spokane & I. E. R. Co., 182 P. 630 (Wash. 1919); Wasmund
v. Wasmund, 156 P. 3 (Wash. 1916); Miller v. Maddocks, 107 P. 1036 (Wash. 1910);
Stockand v. Bartlett, 31 P. 24 (Wash. 1892).
94. See, e.g., Ostheller, 182 P. at 633; Marston v. Rue, 159 P. 111 (Wash. 1916); Mabie
v. Whittaker, 39 P. 172 (Wash. 1895); Holyoke, 3 P. at 841.
95. See, e.g., Holyoke, 3 P. at 842 (“Management and disposition may be vested in
either one or both” spouses, and “[i]f in one, then that one is not thereby made the holder of
larger proprietary rights than the other, but is clothed, in addition to his or her proprietary
rights, with a bare power in trust for the community.”).
96. See, e.g., La Tourette v. La Tourette, 137 P. 426, 429 (Ariz. 1914); Ewald v. Hufton,
173 P. 247 (Idaho 1918); In re Williams’ Estate, 161 P. 40 741 (Nev. 1916); Beals v. Ares,
185 P. 780 (N.M. 1919).
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paid state inheritance tax or federal estate tax, if any, on the portion that passed
under the deceased spouse’s will or by intestacy.97
Texas and Louisiana practiced yet another brand of community property.98 In
these states, the husband held legal title to community income and property, but the
interests of the spouses were beneficially equal. The wife’s interest was vested, but
it was equitable rather than legal.99 Moreover, if record title to community property
was in the wife’s name, the law considered her the legal owner rather than the
husband.100 In either case, whoever enjoyed legal title held the property as well as
the other spouse’s interest in the property as trustee.101 Thus either spouse, as
trustee for the community, could convey good title to a bona fide purchaser even in
fraud of the other member of the community.102
Not all community property laws were created equal. But California’s was the
most conspicuous outlier. Unlike the other seven community property regimes,
California law embodied reformed common law principles of separate interests
more than community property law principles of shared interests.103 It protected the
wife by giving her the right to manage her own separate property and to prevent her
husband from mismanaging her contingent interests in the community. But it did
not make her an immediate co-owner. Because her interests ripened only upon
termination of the marriage by death or divorce, the wife resembled an expectant
heir rather than an equal partner during the existence of the marriage.
To complicate matters, California community property law suffered from
statutory and judicial schizophrenia. By statute, the husband was granted “absolute
ownership” of all community income and property,104 which he was free to manage
and control “with the like absolute power of disposition as of his own separate

97. See, e.g., Kohny v. Dunbar, 121 P. 544 (Idaho 1912). By statute, the surviving
spouse was heir to the predeceasing spouse. In the event the husband predeceased the wife,
her vested interest was freed from the limited control that he exercised over it during
marriage.
98. Commentators at the time noted that although Louisiana community property law
contained aspects of several U.S. community property regimes, it most closely resembled
that of Texas. See Evans, supra note 87, at 63.
99. See Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 195 S.W. 1139 (Tex. 1917).
100. See Mitchell v. Schofield, 171 S.W. 1121 (Tex. 1915); Houston Oil Co. v. Choate,
232 S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921).
101. Compare this to the treatment under California law, where the husband was
considered the legal rather than the equitable owner of property even if property was held
solely in the wife’s name. See Mitchell v. Moses, 117 P. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1911).
102. See, e.g., Edwards v. Brown, 4 S.W. 380 (Tex. 1887); Zimpelman v. Robb, 53 Tex.
274 (1880); Johnson v. Masterson Irr. Co., 217 S.W. 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
103. Susan Prager has documented the “constant tension” in California’s community
property law “between reformed common law and community property philosophies.”
Prager, supra note 83, at 1. Between 1850 and 1891, Prager reports that California
community property law functioned “closely akin to that of a common law state which had
adopted a married women’s property act. . . . As the husband came to be thought of as full
and complete owner of the community property, the wife’s earnings began to be treated as if
they were her separate property.” Id. at 46.
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 172 (approved Mar. 21, 1872).
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estate.”105 Yet his absolute ownership did not allow him to defraud his wife of her
interest in the community, which, again, only ripened upon dissolution of the
marriage.106 If she were merely an expectant heir, with no interest in the
community,107 how could she also be said to circumscribe her husband’s
management of property that by statute he owned absolutely? How, for example,
could she prevent him from assigning her contributions to community income? 108
Or stop him from conveying, selling, leasing, or encumbering the community’s real
property?109 Or from conveying or encumbering household items without her
written consent?110 Or from making a gift of community property without valuable
consideration or her written consent?111 The same statutory framework that granted
the husband absolute ownership of community property and that removed from the
wife all present interest in the community also provided the wife immediate
interests and negative rights that materially qualified the husband’s dominion.112
Not surprisingly, California courts rendered decisions reflecting the statutory
contradictions. Charged with determining the nature of the wife’s interest in
community property, one line of California Supreme Court cases held that the wife
possessed a “mere expectancy” interest,113 while another held she possessed an

105. Act of April 17, 1850, ch. 103, § 9, 1850 Cal. Stat. 254.
106. See, e.g., Lord v. Hough, 43 Cal. 581, 585 (1872); Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 291, 301
(1861); Scott v. Ward, 13 Cal. 458, 469 (1859); Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252, 256 (1855).
107. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 700 (approved Mar. 21, 1872).
108. See Act of June 7, 1913, ch. 287, 1913 Cal. Stat. 537 (invalidating assignments of
wages or salary of either spouse absent written consent).
109. See Act of May 23, 1917, ch. 583, 1917 Cal. Stat. 829–30 (adopting § 172a).
110. See Act of March 23, 1901, ch. CXC, 1901 Cal. Stat. 598.
111. Act of March 31, 1891, ch. 220, 1891 Cal. Stat. 425 (restricting husband’s absolute
management and control of community property).
112. One might even say that the statute provided the wife present and equal ownership
interests in community property. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 682 (West 2007) (enacted in 1872)
(“The ownership of property by several persons is either: 1. Of joint interests; 2. Of
partnership interests; 3. Of interests in common; 4. Of community interest of husband and
wife.”). Inexplicably, California courts relied infrequently on this statute to deny the wife a
present interest in the community. See, e.g., Moore v. Neighbours, 273 P. 36, 36 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1928) (statute defined “community interest of husband and wife” as implying coownership, but married women received co-ownership only upon dissolution of the marriage
by death or divorce).
113. See Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 218 P. 22, 27 (Cal.1923) (wife possesses no existing
ownership in the community); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 158 P. 537, 539 (Cal. 1916) (“heir”);
Cunha v. Hughes, 54 P. 535, 535 (Cal. 1898) (“by succession” rather than as survivor);
Sharp v. Loupe, 52 P. 134, 136 (Cal. 1898) (wife taking interest in the community not as
survivor or co-owner but as “heir”); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 48 P. 228, 231 (Cal. 1897)
(“mere expectancy”); In re Estate of Burdick, 44 P. 734, 735 (Cal. 1896) (finding wife takes
interest in community property by succession rather than right of survivorship due to “mere
expectancy” interest); In re Roland’s Estate, 16 P. 315, 316–17 (Cal. 1888) (finding “estate
in expectancy of the wife in the community property is dependent upon her survivorship; and
in the event of her death before her husband, it is deemed never to have existed.” (emphasis
in original)); Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525, 538 (1861) (“mere expectancy”); Van Maren
v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860) (holding “interest of the wife is a mere expectancy, like
the interest which an heir may possess in the property of his ancestor”).

1478

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1459

“existing, vested” interest.114 The statutes were not solely to blame for the disparate
though parallel holdings. Judges reared in the common law tradition awkwardly
grafted foreign property law concepts onto California’s civil law system, resulting
in imperfect analogies and inconsistent rulings.115 These jurists were slow to confer
equal authority on law developed by legislative grace rather than by judicial
deliberation and precedent.116 They were slower still, to embrace a property law

114. See In re Brix’s Estate, 186 P. 135, 138 (Cal. 1919) (finding wife could “be awarded
. . . the whole” of community property upon husband’s death, her half plus his); In re Rossi’s
Estate, 146 P. 430, 431 (Cal. 1915) (wife takes possession of her interest “by virtue of
survivorship”); Dirs. of Fallbrook Dist. v. Abila, 39 P. 794, 795–96 (Cal. 1895) (wife’s
interest “no doubt, more tangible” than the right of an expectant heir); King v. Lagrange, 50
Cal. 328, 333 (1875) (wife takes possession of her interest as “survivor”); De Godey v.
Godey, 39 Cal. 157, 164 (1870) (stating community property “belongs to the matrimonial
community, and not less to the wife than to the husband”); Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265,
271 (1869) (finding wife possessed “a joint and equal interest with the husband in all
property acquired during the marriage”); Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 291, 301 (1861) (wife
possesses “undivided” interest in the community); Smith v. Smith, 12 Cal. 216, 225 (1859)
(emphasizing wife’s “half interest in the common property”); Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247,
251 (1859) (finding both spouses “possess[] an equal right to succeed to the property after
dissolution”); In re Buchanan’s Estate, 8 Cal. 507, 510 (1857) (holding property acquired
during marriage “belonged to the community, and upon the death of the husband the widow
took one half” as survivor); Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252, 256 (1855) (finding spouses “jointly
seized of the property,” and wife’s interest “present, definite, and certain”).
115. See Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 402 (1924) (attributing
“confusion in the decisions of the California courts” to “the fact that the courts have been
attempting, in their opinions, to apply the terminology of the common law to community
property, which embodies a legal concept wholly foreign to the common law, and to which
the terminology of the common law cannot be applied with accuracy and precision”); Robert
G. Hooker, Jr., Nature of Wife’s Interest in Community Property in California, 15 CALIF. L.
REV. 302, 302 (1927) (attributing “confusion” to “minds trained to the common law”);
William A. Reppy, Jr., Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms,
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1055–59 (1975) (exploring inability of common law trained lawyers
to comprehend and embrace co-ownership under marital property law); Schuele, supra note
81, at 251 (describing “a strong allegiance to Anglo-American common law culture that was
quite at odds with the prevailing legal culture”); J. Emmett Sebree, Federal Taxation of
Community Property, 12 TEX. L. REV. 273, 275, 281 (1934) (stating “wife’s interest is hard
to define in terms of the common law and any theory which regards the interest of the
spouses as ‘equal, present and vested’ is difficult to apply”).
116. In the first U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting community property law, the Court
acknowledged the difficulty in applying common law principles to civil law systems. In
Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 497 (1900), involving Washington community property
law, the majority wrote that, unlike common law, it was a “misconception” of the civil law
system “to suppose that because power was vested in the husband to dispose of the
community acquired during marriage, as if it were his own, therefore by law the community
property belonged solely to the husband.” The husband was given management and control
over marital property “not because he was the exclusive owner, but because by law he was
created the agent of community.” Id. at 494. In Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911),
applying New Mexico law, Justice Holmes explained why courts may have viewed the
husband as the sole owner of the community: “The notion may have been helped by the
subjection of the woman to marital power . . . and in this country by confusion between the
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system that conferred equal rights on married women and that replaced legal
patriarchy with marital co-ownership.117
Divining a wife’s property interests in California and elsewhere proved
exceedingly difficult. In fact, the same court that termed a wife’s interest “a mere
expectancy” expressed in the same judicial term “no doubt” that upon a husband’s
death, the wife “took one undivided half of the common property in her own right
by virtue of the community existing between herself and husband.”118 Heirs did not
usually take by right of survivorship. No wonder the U.S. Attorney General,119 the
Treasury Department,120 and members of Congress121 found community property
law difficult to understand. So did judges.
III. CO-OWNERSHIP AND THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
The federal government first examined the nature of a wife’s interest under
California community property law in 1920. As part of an effort to crack down on
tax avoidance through income shifting arrangements, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue requested an opinion from the Attorney General on the federal tax
treatment of income and property reported by spouses living in community
property states. In particular, the Commissioner wanted to know, first, whether
community property spouses, based on their ownership of community income and
property, were permitted to make separate returns reflecting one-half the
community income, and, second, whether the gross estate of a decedent spouse in
community property states should include “one-half and only one-half of the
community property of husband and wife domiciled therein” on the theory that the
surviving spouse took the property as co-owner rather than heir.122 The Treasury
previously examined these questions with respect to Texas community property
law and concluded that Texas spouses could render separate income tax returns
reflecting one-half the community’s income from earnings and property,123 and,
furthermore, that a surviving spouse in Texas could be taxed, if at all, on only onehalf the gross estate of the decedent spouse, because she already owned the other

practical effect of the husband’s power and its legal ground, if not by mistranslation of
ambiguous words like domino.” Id. (emphasis in original).
117. Prager, supra note 83, at 34–39; Schuele, supra note 81, at 262 (“Legislators appear
to have been unable to ignore their common-law heritage and may even have been hostile
toward the property rights of married women.”).
118. Payne, 18 Cal. at 301.
119. See infra notes 122–57 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 158–63, 201–07 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 170–200 and accompanying text.
122. Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 436 (1921); T.D.
3138, 4 C.B. 238 (1921).
123. Income Tax—Cmty. Prop., 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 298, 307–08 (1920); T.D. 3071, 3
C.B. 221 (1920). The opinion concluded that marriage in Texas was a “conjugal
partnership[],” Income Tax—Cmty. Prop., 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 298, 303 (1920), in which “the
earnings of the husband and wife belong to them jointly in equal shares,” and where “the
community interest attaches as soon as the right to the wages comes into existence,” id. at
306.
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half.124 The Attorney General now sought to determine the federal tax treatment of
married couples in the remaining seven community property states.
Ownership interest in income and property determined taxability of these
couples, the Attorney General said,125 and state property law would determine
ownership.126 As early as 1812, the U.S. Supreme Court was “clearly of opinion”
that ownership of land “can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by
the law of the place where such land is situate[d].”127 Moreover, the Court followed
“a principle firmly established” that it must look to state law “for the rules which
govern [property’s] descent, alienation and transfer, and for the effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.”128 Also, where state courts “have
interpreted state laws governing real property or controlling relations which are
essentially of a domestic and state nature,” the Supreme Court would “if it is
possible to do so . . . adopt and follow the settled rule of construction affixed by the
state court of last resort to the statutes of the State, and thus conform to the rule of
property within the State.”129 As such, the government was careful to emphasize
that it was conforming to longstanding practice and “adopt[ing] the rules laid down
by the highest courts of the various States.”130
The Attorney General examined each community property state in turn. In
Washington, the wife possessed during “coverture” as well as upon dissolution of
the marriage “a vested and definite interest and title in community property, equal
in all respects to the interest and title of her husband.”131 In Arizona, wives also
enjoyed “an equal interest” with husbands in community property.132 According to
the Arizona Supreme Court, the law “gives the husband no higher or better title
than it gives the wife. It recognizes a marital community wherein both are equal. Its
policy plainly expressed is to give the wife in this marital community an equal
dignity, and make her an equal factor in matrimonial gains.”133 The interest of the
wife was “not a mere possibility—not the expectancy of an heir.”134 Similarly, the
Attorney General found equal ownership interests in the marital communities of
Idaho,135 Louisiana,136 New Mexico,137 and Nevada.138 Only in California did the
wife suffer less than co-ownership in community property. Rather than viewing the
wife as owner of the community, “the highest courts of that State” held that “during
coverture the wife has no vested interest in the community property, her interest

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See T.D. 2450, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 38 (1917).
See Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 462 (1921).
Id. at 461–62.
United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 115, 116 (1812).
De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U.S. 566, 570 (1897).
Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 496 (1900).
Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 462 (1921).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 438.
Id. (quoting La Tourette v. La Tourette, 137 P. 426, 428 (Ariz. 1914)).
Id. (quoting La Tourette v. La Tourette, 137 P. 426, 428 (Ariz. 1914)).
Id at 440.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 452.
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therein being a mere expectancy.”139 Recent changes to the California statute, the
opinion noted, did not alter the wife’s unequal interest in community property.140
The Attorney General concluded that for married residents in all community
property states except California, “the ownership in one-half of all community
property vests in each spouse.”141 For federal income tax purposes, spouses in those
states could file separate returns each reporting one-half the community income,
and for federal estate tax purposes, only one-half of the community property should
be included in the decedent’s gross estate.142 In other words, equal ownership under
community property law was not a tax avoidance device.
A. The Treasury Department and California Tax “Evaders”
Subsequent events in California prompted the federal government to reconsider
its 1921 ruling only a few years later. In 1923, the Treasury Department requested
that the Attorney General reexamine the nature of a wife’s interest in California as
a result of recent amendments to the state’s community property statute as well as
judicial interpretations finding the wife’s interest in the California community to be
greater than a mere expectancy. The Attorney General conducted a careful review
of the evolving California community property law from the 1849 constitution to
the latest amendments of the codified statute.
Even just considering “the restrictions placed on the husband’s control of
community property” by recent statutory changes, the Attorney General found it
“difficult to see how the judicial mind can conceive of his possessing the elements
of absolute ownership over the community estate.”143 It was clear to the Attorney
General that the husband’s interest was “only qualified and partial.”144 One line of
California decisions may have described the wife as an “heir expectant,” but
another “recognize[d] her property interest in community gains.”145 More
importantly, the “heir expectant” line of cases got it wrong, according to the
Attorney General, particularly given the “numerous amendments” to California’s
community property law since 1917 revealing “the intent of the legislature to
protect what [those] California decision[s] had failed to recognize—the vested
interest of the wife in community estate.”146

139. Id. at 456.
140. The Attorney General found that these amendments failed “to make so revolutionary
a change in the existing rule of property in California as to devest [sic] the husband of his
ownership in the community property” or “vest in the wife any interest thereto prior to the
dissolution of the community.” Id. at 458.
141. See id. at 462.
142. Id. at 463.
143. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 383–84 (1924); T.D.
3569, III-1 C.B. 91, 96 (1924).
144. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 385 (1924).
145. Id. at 379.
146. Id. The California community property statute was “clear, and plainly bottomed
upon a recognition of a property interest in the wife.” Id. at 385. Legal scholars agreed with
this conclusion. See, e.g., Hooker, supra note 115, at 308 (“If the wife can get half the
community property on divorce; if she gets that half by operation of law where the decree
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The “expectant heir” line of cases lost further precedential value in light of
federal court decisions determining “the real nature of a wife’s interest” in
California.147 In Wardell v. Blum, the Ninth Circuit held that a California widow, in
the words of the Attorney General, “comes into possession of her half of the
community property, not as his heir, but by virtue of her valid vested interest in the
community estate.”148 The Ninth Circuit further held that recent changes to the
California inheritance tax law reflected “manifestly . . . a clear statutory declaration
that the wife’s half of the community property is not part of the property of the
deceased husband,” and “even if the case was not controlled by the California
statute . . . applying to it the rule of law announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States . . . the result, it seems to us, must be the same,” namely, “‘[i]t is very
plain that the wife has a greater interest than the mere possibility of an expectant
heir.’”149 The district court had condemned even more strongly the “expectant heir”
line of cases. In finding the amendments to the inheritance tax law retroactive, the
district court opined, “[I]f that act does not recognize in the wife a valid, subsisting,
vested interest and estate in the community property during the life of the husband,
language is without meaning and legislation without avail.”150
Based on the Blum decision and a thorough review of California community
property law, the Attorney General concluded that its 1921 opinion “can not
stand.”151 It “must be modified to harmonize” with the Blum decision to reflect the
“true rule” of law in California that the wife enjoys a greater interest in the
community than a mere expectancy, which “clearly recognize[s] that the wife’s half
of community property is not a part of the property of the deceased husband.”152
The former opinion was thereby amended, approved by the Treasury Department,
and incorporated into official field guidance for revenue agents around the
country.153 For both federal income and estate tax purposes, spouses in all eight
community property states were deemed to own one-half community income and
property and were thus permitted to file separate returns each reflecting half the
community’s gross income.
Demonstrably chagrined and desiring a different outcome, the Attorney General
withdrew his opinion within two months for further consideration.154 Several
does not mention the property; if she can revoke a gift even as to specific property; can it be
consistently said that she takes as an heir, as one who can be defeated by the merest whim of
the ancestor? . . . An heir has nothing, but a wife has testamentary power.”); Esmond
Schapiro, Status of Federal Income and Estate Taxes on Community Property in California,
12 CALIF. L. REV. 99, 100–01 (1924) (arguing statutory changes left no doubt that the wife’s
interest in California community property was fully vested during marriage).
147. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 378 (1924).
148. Id.; see also Wardell v. Blum, 276 F. 226, 227–28 (9th Cir. 1921) (finding “wife of
a decedent acquires upon his death one-half of the community property in her own right, and
not as heir of her husband”).
149. Wardell, 276 F. at 228–29 (last quote quoting Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320
(1911)); see also Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 377–78
(1924).
150. Blum v. Wardell, 270 F. 309, 314–15 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
151. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Fed. Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 376, 378 (1924).
152. Id. at 378, 393 (emphasis omitted in last quote).
153. See T.D. 3568, III-1 C.B. 84 (1924).
154. T.D. 3596, III-1 C.B. 101 (1924).
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months later he reaffirmed the earlier opinion, but with palpable reluctance. “I am
constrained to reestablish and reaffirm that opinion,” the Attorney General
concluded.155 After “a full review” and “a study of the situation presented by the
California decisions including those handed down by the Supreme Court of
California since the decision of Blum v. Wardell, and considering those principles
which must govern the incidence of a Federal taxing statute upon a subject matter
which is the creation of State law,” the Attorney General was “unable to find those
considerations which would . . . justify the Government in beginning anew in some
other case, a juridical controversy which was litigated to a final conclusion . . . and
in which the Government’s position was fully presented.”156 The opinion was
limited to the wife’s interest under the federal estate tax, but “express[ed] no
opinion with respect to the principles which govern the taxation of income derived
from community property.”157
Down but not out, the Treasury Department accepted the reaffirmed ruling with
respect to the nature of a California wife’s interest for purposes of the federal estate
tax. At the same time, it received permission from the Attorney General to litigate
the nature of the wife’s interest for purposes of the federal income tax. In a
document sent to all revenue agents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote,
“It is the judgment of the Treasury that public interest requires a final determination
of the right of the husband and wife each to return separately one-half of the
community income.”158 The Commissioner expressed “grave doubt” as to the
legality of the earlier Treasury decisions, because
the husband has complete control of the community income and may
dispose of it as he sees fit during his lifetime without the consent of his
wife. It is obviously a somewhat strained construction to consider that
the husband has received only one-half of his earnings for income tax
purposes although he controls for practical purposes the whole.159

155. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 405 (1924).
156. Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 404–05 (1924). At the time
of the Attorney General’s opinion, and shortly after the Blum decision, two additional
decisions had been handed down by the California Supreme Court. See Roberts v.
Wehmeyer, 218 P. 22, 26 (Cal. 1923) (finding no retroactive effect to amended statute);
Taylor v. Taylor, 218 P. 756 (Cal. 1923) (holding upon dissolution by divorce and without a
property decree the wife becomes owner of one-half the community property as tenant in
common with her husband). The Attorney General noted that the two decisions reflected the
two disparate lines of cases in California, and that notwithstanding the federal court’s final
determination in Blum, “[i]f confusion existed before so far as the California decisions are
concerned, it is now the more confounded.” Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y
Gen. 395, 401 (1924).
157. Id. at 405. The qualified holding raised questions about the authority of guidance
issued a few months earlier directing revenue agents to treat California spouses the same as
other community property spouses for purposes of the federal income tax. See T.D. 3568,
III-1 C.B. 84 (1924).
158. T.D. 3670, IV-1 C.B. 19, 19 (1925).
159. Id. The Commissioner was undeterred by contrary Supreme Court rulings, including
Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 497 (1900) (calling it a “misconception . . . to suppose
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The Commissioner was particularly concerned about the tax avoidance
opportunities created by the “valuable privilege” of separate filing.160 If California
spouses prevailed in the courts and were found to have a right to file separate
returns, the government would already owe significant tax refunds for previous
years.161 Such funds, the Commissioner was quick to point out, would come “out of
the taxes collected from citizens of other States” who were unable to take
advantage of this tax “privilege.”162 “In fairness to the country as a whole,” the
Treasury Department, in conjunction with the Attorney General, would seek to
expedite a case to the Supreme Court for a final resolution.163
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE ATTACK AGAINST THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY TAX LOOPHOLE
The Treasury Department also lobbied Congress that community property law
created unjustified tax inequities. The civil law system perpetrated geographic tax
discrimination, according to the Treasury, by providing tax savings to a minority of
husbands and wives in a handful of states. In 1921, the Treasury Department
crafted a legislative proposal taxing all marital income to the spouse “having the
management and control of the community property.”164 The plan targeted spouses
in community property states and effectively prevented them from filing separate
income tax returns while leaving married couples in common law states free to file
separately or jointly.165 As in its earlier rulings on the nature of a wife’s interest in
community property, the Treasury proceeded even though the Supreme Court had
already ruled that “might” was not synonymous with “right.”166 The “marked
advantage” enjoyed by married residents of community property states, the Senate
Finance Committee wrote in its explanation of the Treasury proposal, was
inequitable in any event167 and had been condemned by both the Attorney General
and the Treasury Department. “Income which in other States is taxed as a unit to
the husband,” the Finance Committee said, “is divided between husband and wife
in States having community property laws, and the surtaxes are correspondingly

that because power was vested in the husband to dispose of the community acquired during
marriage, as if it were his own, therefore by law the community property belonged solely to
the husband”) and Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911) (finding despite husband’s
management powers over community property during marriage, “it is very plain that the wife
has a greater interest than the mere possibility of an expectant heir”).
160. T.D. 3670, IV-1 C.B. 19, 20 (1925).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 11 (1921).
165. See id. at 13.
166. See supra note 159. The Treasury also ignored the recent ruling in Blum v. Wardell,
270 F. 309, 314 (D. Cal. 1920), to which both the Attorney General’s 1921 opinion and the
Treasury’s 1921 ruling referred (“[A]gency of the husband as head of the family is much
broader, and his control and dominion over personal property much greater, than in the case
of real property; but it has never been supposed, that this difference lessens the estate of the
wife in community personal property, or calls for a different rule of succession.”).
167. See S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 14 (1921).
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reduced.”168 The proposed change would “restore uniformity of treatment” to
married taxpayers nationwide.169
Members of Congress required little convincing that such treatment was
unjustified. Most of them viewed community property law as a tax loophole that
should be closed. “Why should the husband of a woman in Arizona,” asked Senator
Reed Smoot of Utah, “whose wife has no income whatever from property held by
her, have a less rate of taxation imposed upon him than a man in the same position
in the State of New York?”170 Similarly, Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania
saw “no reason why the so-called marital community system in Arizona should
have a preference in connection with taxation in this relation over Pennsylvania or
New York. Certainly all parts of the country ought to be similarly treated.”171
Like the Treasury Department, supporters of the management-and-control
proposal believed that dominion over marital income and property rather than
shared legal interests under property law principles should determine taxability.
“Suppose, as is the case, husband and wife own the property jointly, but the
husband has the sole management of the property and derives the sole income from
its use and enjoyment. Having that income, should he not pay the tax on that
income?”172 Watson answered his own question: “[O]wnership has nothing in the
world to do with it; it is solely a question of income. The wife does not control the
income and the husband has no accounting to make afterwards. He does not
account for a dollar . . . .”173
The gendered lens of the common law, as much as legislators’ lack of
familiarity with the civil law, influenced Congress’s perspective. The “only way” a
wife can access her “half” of the marital income, said Senator Smoot, “is to go into
court and break the community bond, and in my State the only way the wife can do
it is by doing the same thing, by getting a divorce.”174 In community property
states, Smoot opined (albeit inaccurately), the wife had no legal control over
marital income. “It is not her income unless she dissolves the community interest.
She does not own it; she does not control it; she cannot invest a dollar of it. The
husband does that; he receives the income; he has the distribution of it, and he
ought to pay the tax.”175
Even if the husband acted as “trustee” for his wife’s share, as some community
property representatives analogized,176 he could still be made to pay the entire tax.

168. See id.
169. Id. Congressional supporters of the plan also touted its tax equalization effects. See
61 CONG. REC. 5914 (1921) (statement of Sen. Penrose) (arguing that the plan “proposes to
place the so-called community property States on an equality with the other States of the
Union from the point of view of taxation”).
170. 61 CONG. REC. 5916 (1921) (statement of Sen. Smoot).
171. Id. at 5914 (statement of Sen. Penrose).
172. Id. at 5917 (statement of Sen. Watson).
173. Id. at 5920.
174. Id. at 5921 (statement of Sen. Smoot).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 6874 (statement of Charles E. Dunbar, Jr.) (“The husband as a rule is
given by law the administration of this property during the marriage which is in the nature of
the right of a managing partner at common law or a trustee with very full power of
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“I do not think there is any limitation on the right of the Government of the United
States,” argued Senator Oscar Underwood, “to tax the property in the hands of the
trustee who holds it for somebody else rather than in the hands of the actual
owner.”177 The trusteeship argument for taxing the husband on only one-half of the
community income proved as unpersuasive as the partnership argument.178 “It is
not the same as a partnership at all,” said Senator Smoot.179 He continued:
If the wife had the right in Louisiana to demand half of all of the gains
that are received by the husband and take that money and put it in her
own name, and had a right to invest it no matter whether the husband
objected or not, then she would control it, and it would be her
income . . . . 180
Senator Smoot concluded, “but it is not her income. It is the husband’s income,”181
and he should remit the tax.
Community property law did not reflect a more socially progressive property
law regime, as its supporters suggested.182 Nor was it better aligned than traditional
common law with political egalitarianism and ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment.183 To its critics, it was a tax avoidance device that, if left unchecked,
would grow into a capacious tax loophole. Suppose a state “wanted to extend her
community law,” Senator Smoot suggested ominously, “[by providing] that it shall
administration.”); see also id. at 5918 (statement of Sen. Broussard) (explaining that the “law
merely permits” the husband to act as trustee of his wife’s share and arguing that “[i]t is not
his income, it is not his revenue. He only has one half of that and the other half is permitted
to remain in his custody provided his spouse is willing for him to invest it in her interest; but
he at no time owns that other half.”).
177. Id. at 5916 (statement of Sen. Underwood).
178. Community property representatives likened the marital partnership to business
partnerships. See id. at 6873 (statement of Sen. Ransdell) (reading a letter from a lawyer
constituent saying “marital community is a partnership, [in which spouses] have an equal
interest in the profits of the partnership, [such that] Congress can no more force the husband
to treat the entire community income as his than it could compel an ordinary commercial
partner to return the entire income of the partnership as his own”).
179. Id. at 5920 (statement of Sen. Smoot).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Community property representatives underscored enlightened aspects of the civil
law. See id. at 5915 (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (quoting legal scholar Richard Ballinger as
noting the law’s “many commendable features,” including “social advancement” and
inevitable influence over the traditional common law, which “can [no longer] impede the
development of a system of laws which yield to the wife, in matters of property, the equality
of interest and right with the husband which Christian justice demands”). Under reformed
common law, it was less clear whether wives possessed greater or lesser legal interests than
wives in community property states. In California during the late nineteenth century, for
instance, “women’s legal status was . . . worse . . . than in common law states with married
woman’s property acts,” while other community property states worked to “empower
women rather than simply to protect them.” Schuele, supra note 81, at 263, 281.
183. See 61 CONG. REC. 5915 (1921) (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (arguing civil law states
had long guaranteed legal and economic rights for wives in the same spirit as the suffrage
movement).
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not only apply to wife and husband but to every child they may have.”184 If
Congress had to accept each state’s definition of taxable income, “then a State
could pass a law claiming not only community privileges for the husband and wife
but for every child that was born to the husband and wife.”185 Families with six or
seven children would be able to divide family income “in such [a] way that a man
could have at least $70,000 or $75,000 [of] income [$865,000 to $925,000 in 2011
dollars] and never pay a cent of income tax.”186 States would seek to benefit their
own citizens at the expense of the national government, and tax revenues would
shrink dramatically.187
Defenders of the community property system freely acknowledged its favorable
tax effects. But similar tax saving was also available to common law married
couples through unrestricted tax avoidance devices. Husbands and wives in non–
community property states could “execute a partnership agreement embodying the
identical principles” of community property law, and thereby “enjoy all the benefits
of separate returns for taxation purposes.”188 Moreover, to the extent Congress
should be concerned about income shifting between spouses, these private law
partnerships were considerably more superficial than community partnerships. The
partnerships available to common law spouses were voluntary and authorized by a
state’s contract law, while community partnerships were mandatory for all
husbands and wives and carried with them significant legal responsibilities.
Community property law “impose[d] serious property limitations on the husband in
the nature of a marital partnership.”189 In fact, the “burdens and limitations” on the
husband “may well be considered sufficient to counterbalance the taxation benefits
that now exist and certainly justify the recognition of the community system by the
Federal Government in its scheme of taxation.”190 Common law husbands paid
more tax than community property husbands on equal amounts of income, but they
also enjoyed unfettered command over marital property.
Common law husbands reaped additional benefits. In the event of divorce,
spouses under community property law split marital income and property in half,
while common law husbands could take it all. In addition, a community property
wife could “will one-half of the property that may be acquired as a result of the

184. Id. at 5918 (statement of Sen. Smoot).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 6 (1921) (arguing “excessively high [tax] rates”
encouraged “various methods of tax evasion,” including income shifting under community
property law).
188. 61 CONG. REC. 6875 (1921).
189. Id. at 6876 (statement of Charles E. Dunbar). Community property representatives
attributed support for the Treasury’s management and control proposal to confusion over the
civil law system. Id. at 5915 (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (expressing “no doubt” that
common law legislators “able lawyers as they are, who have been trained under the common
law found this a perplexing subject and that their intellects could not at once grasp this
puzzling question of community property law”); id. at 6873–74 (1921) (“[P]rinciples which
are peculiar to the laws of the [community property] States . . . are not so well known or
understood by others from the common-law States.” (quoting Oct. 19, 1921 letter from Jesse
Andrews to Hon. William E. Borah)).
190. Id. at 6876.

1488

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 86:1459

marriage partnership to her twenty-second cousin or to a stranger” without her
husband’s permission.191 A common law wife “has no such right, and the husband’s
property is subject only to his disposition by will or the law of inheritance of the
State.”192 A community property husband, moreover, could not give away his
wife’s interest in the community, but a common law husband “is not subject to any
such limitation.”193 And while a community property husband could not defraud his
wife of her interest in the community or act as a “reckless and dangerous trustee,” a
common law husband could dispose of marital property “by gambling or in as
reckless and extravagant manner as he chooses.”194
In the end, the management and control plan did not make it into the Revenue
Act of 1921.195 Whether it was the unified effort among community property
representatives to educate their common law colleagues on the practical effects of
the civil law; embarrassment that the plan contradicted recent advances in women’s
legal and political rights; statistics reporting that only a fraction of married
taxpayers filed separate income tax returns and that recent tax cuts mitigated the
benefits of separate filing;196 the availability of income-shifting devices for
common law spouses;197 wariness over impinging on states’ sovereign power to
determine laws of a “domestic and state nature;”198 or legitimate concern that the
plan was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
(by taxing one person on the property of another)199 as well as the Uniformity
Clause pertaining to Congress’s taxing power (by imposing geographic
discrimination in applying direct taxes),200 the Treasury proposal went down in
defeat.

191. Id. at 6875.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 6875–76.
195. See H.R. REP. NO. 67-486, pt. 2, at 1, 11 (1921) (Conf. Rep.).
196. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, at 233, 237 (lowering top marginal
rate on individuals from 73% to 58%).
197. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text; see also Stanley S. Surrey,
Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 791, 813–14 (1933) [hereinafter Surrey, Assignments of Income] (“[I]f it is the declared
policy of a state that contractual assignments between spouses are desirable and enforceable,
the situation does not differ appreciably from that in community property states.”); Note,
Disparity of Federal Tax Incidence Resulting from Division of Income Under Community
Property Laws, 40 YALE L.J. 665, 666 (1931) (“Where income is derived from property,
uniformity in federal revenue exaction is presently possible, since in the non-community
states an assignment of such property would effect the same result as in the communityproperty states.”).
198. Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 496 (1900); see also De Vaughn v. Hutchinson,
165 U.S. 566, 570 (1897); United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S. 115, 116 (1812).
199. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 5918 (1921) (statement of Sen. Broussard) (arguing “no
man may be required to return property which is not vested in him or does not belong to him,
and to pay taxes upon it”).
200. See, e.g., id. at 5919 (statement of Sen. Underwood) (arguing bill makes “a
distinction as to communities where the civil law prevails and a division of the property
under the law rests between the husband and wife. It seems to me that that is a geographical
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Undeterred, Secretary Mellon urged Congress to include an identical version of
the plan in the Revenue Act of 1924.201 The “unfair advantage” enjoyed by
residents of community property states “over the citizens of the other States of this
country,” Mellon told Congress, cost the Treasury dearly in lost revenues.202
Taxing community income “to the spouse having control of the income” would
“restore the equality” of taxation nationwide.203 Mellon’s management and control
plan fared even worse than the 1921 proposal, failing to make it out of committee.
The plan increased taxes on married taxpayers in community property states, which
conflicted with Congress’s desire for across-the-board rate reduction.204 As
important, community property representatives mobilized quickly against the plan,
marshaling opposition from elected officials, chambers of commerce, taxpayer
associations, and citizen committees, while bombarding Congress with letters,
testimony, and legal briefs.205
Even in defeat, Mellon was steadfast in his desire to end the “unfair advantage”
enjoyed by community property taxpayers. He wrote once more to Congress:
“There is a serious question in my mind as to whether or not any State, which has
by the sixteenth amendment granted to the Federal Government the right to levy
income taxes, can make the graduated income tax of the Federal Government
ineffective by passing a community property law.”206 For the time being, however,
there was no need for legislative action. The question concerning how to tax
spouses in community property states was presently before the Supreme Court in a

division, and if it be a geographical division then the proposal is unconstitutional”). This
argument would soon prove unavailing. See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927) (“All
that the Constitution requires is that the law shall be uniform in the sense that by its
provisions the rule of liability shall be the same in all parts of the United States.” (citation
omitted)).
201. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
202. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON
THE STATE OF FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED ON JUNE 30, 1923, at 9 (1924).
203. Id.
204. The 1924 law followed the Revenue Act of 1921 by further slashing taxes and
lowering the top marginal rate from 58% to 46%. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat.
253, 264, 267 (1924).
205. See, e.g., Revenue Revision, 1924: Hearings Before the H.R. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 68th Cong. 194–97 (1924) (statement of Rep. O’Connor); id. at 195 (statement of
Walter Parker, New Orleans Association of Commerce); id. at 348–61 (statement of R. C.
Fulbright, Houston Chamber of Commerce and Texas Taxpayers); id. at 362–63 (statement
of Rep. Black); id. at 363–71 (statement of John J. Underwood, Seattle Chamber of
Commerce); id. at 371–74 (statement of Walter Mossaman, Counsel for Association of
Washington Taxpayers); id. at 375–87 (statement of Charles E. Dunbar Jr., Citizens
Committee and New Orleans Association of Commerce); id. at 478–82 (statement of Rep.
Miller): id. at 482–85 (statement of Rep. Summers). After passage of the Revenue Act of
1924, the Treasury issued regulations recognizing the right of married couples in community
property states (excluding California) to file separate returns reflecting income which “under
the laws of the respective States, becomes simultaneously with its receipt community
property.” T.D. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 745, 755 (1924).
206. Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the H.R. Comm. on Ways and Means,
69th Cong. 9 (1925).
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case originating in California. Perhaps the Court could accomplish what Congress
had failed to do: “restore the equality” between taxpayers nationwide.207
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND FAMILY TAXATION: DEFINING OWNERSHIP
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wardell v. Blum208 and the Treasury
Department’s acquiescence to the holding209 created a split decision. For estate tax
purposes, a California wife possessed a one-half vested interest in community
income and property, but for income tax purposes she did not. The U.S. Supreme
Court weighed in on the issue with respect to the federal income tax and ended up
accentuating rather than ameliorating the distinction.
In United States v. Robbins,210 the Court considered for only the fifth time in its
history the nature of a wife’s interest under community property law.211 More
importantly, for the first time, it considered the nature of a wife’s interest for
purposes of the federal income tax. Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes said
that a California wife possessed a “mere expectancy” in the community under the
laws of California prior to 1917.212 As a result, she could not make a separate
income tax return reporting one-half the community income. All income of the
community was taxable wholly to the husband. In so holding, the Court reversed
the district court’s lengthy finding that statutory changes over twenty-five years had
so restricted the rights and powers of the California husband with respect to the
community that the wife possessed “a real, substantial, vested, and existing
interest,” and that the husband’s dominion over the community was “no broader
than it is in some of the other community property states.”213 Unlike the district
court, the Supreme Court conducted a cursory examination of California
community property statutes, relied on dated case law, and disregarded subsequent

207. Id.
208. See Wardell v. Blum, 276 F. 226 (9th Cir. 1921); supra notes 148–50 and
accompanying text.
209. See Cmty. Prop. in Cal.—Estate Tax, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 404–05 (1924); supra
notes 147–53 and accompanying text.
210. 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
211. See Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 320 (1911) (finding New Mexico wife possessed
present vested interest in community property notwithstanding husband’s management and
control over community); Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U.S. 400 (1910) (holding even if California
wife owned one-half the community property prior to her husband’s death, the U.S.
Constitution did not prevent the state from imposing a tax on wife’s share); Garrozi v.
Dastas, 204 U.S. 64 (1907) (holding reasonableness of expenditures made by husband during
marriage as manager of the community under Puerto Rico’s community property law was
not a question to be decided by the courts); Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 496 (1900)
(holding Washington wife possessed a present vested interest in community property).
212. Robbins, 269 U.S. at 327.
213. Robbins v. United States, 5 F.2d 690, 697, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1925); see also id. at 705
(“It is the marriage which creates the ownership; death or divorce merely give
possession. . . . And the truth and substance is that only one-half of the income really
belongs to the husband; the other half, in law and right and justice to the wife.”).
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acts of the state legislature expressing its intent to provide vested rights in the
wife.214
The holding was a blow to married taxpayers in California. But the dicta was a
bombshell for married taxpayers nationwide, particularly those living in
community property states. The nature of the wife’s interest as determined by state
courts, Holmes wrote, was to be followed “so far as material.”215 In addition,
“[e]ven if we are wrong as to the law of California and assume that the wife had an
interest in the community income that Congress could tax if so minded, it does not
follow that Congress could not tax the husband for the whole.”216 If the husband
controlled the income, he could be taxed on it regardless of its ownership as
determined by state property law. “[H]e alone has the disposition of the fund. He
may spend it substantially as he chooses, and if he wastes it in debauchery the wife
has no redress. . . . That he may be taxed for such a fund,” Holmes concluded
summarily, “seems to us to need no argument.”217
Congress,218 the Attorney General,219 and previous Courts220 had felt constrained
by state law characterizations of ownership in locating “the most obvious target for
the shaft.”221 The Court had liberated them. Community income could “be in two
places at once,”222 both “wholly the income of the husband and half the income of
the wife.”223 In deciding whom to tax, courts now had a choice, because both

214. The Court relied particularly on Spreckels v. Spreckels, 48 P. 228 (Cal. 1897)
(holding wife’s interest a mere expectancy, and finding no distinction between community
estates and the separate estate of the husband, even subsequent to statutory amendments).
215. Robbins, 269 U.S. at 326.
216. Id. at 327.
217. Id. (citation omitted).
218. In the same year the Court decided Robbins, Congress included a provision in the
Revenue Act of 1926 indicating that state law was the final arbiter of ownership with respect
to marital property. See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1212, 44 Stat. 9, 130 (stating where
“the wife has a vested interest as distinguished from an expectancy,” income and property
should be reported “by the spouse to whom the income belonged under the State law
applicable to such marital community for such period” (emphasis added)).
219. See Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435, 461 (1921);
supra notes 125–30 (citing Supreme Court precedent).
220. See supra notes 127–29 and 211 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court had
been particularly clear on this subject with respect to determining respective interests of
spouses in marital property. See Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U.S. 400, 406 (1910) (finding “nature
and character of the right of the wife in the community for the purpose of taxation was
peculiarly a local question which we have no power to review”). When faced with
interpreting a state statute or rule of property, however, the Court recognized that if state
decisions were in conflict or failed to establish a definitive rule, it could exercise its own
judgment. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (invalidating state
definition of a “lease” as a “sale” with respect to sub-soil rights and holding “[an] Act of
Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of any particular characterization . . . in the local
law”); Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925) (disregarding state
classification of a business enterprise).
221. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 328 (1926).
222. Developments in the Law—Taxation 1933, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1273 (1934)
(referring to Robbins) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
223. Douglas B. Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax (pt. 2), 14
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husband and wife could be said to own rights in community income and the
property from which it flowed. If Congress wanted to tax both members of the
community as co-owners, then ownership as determined by state statutes and
interpreted by state courts could be considered “material.” If, on the other hand,
Congress wanted to tax the husband on the entirety of community income and
property, then ownership under state law could give way to the husband’s
“beneficial [interest]” where “the possession of power of disposition [became] in
and of itself a proper test of income tax liability.”224 In other words, income could
include “not only property the legal ownership of which is acquired by the taxpayer
during the tax period, but also property, the beneficial ownership of which is thus
acquired.”225 In the end, Robbins highlighted that income and property in a marital
partnership could “be taxed to the person who controls them, although he does not
own them or the property producing them.”226 That possibility meant that husbands
in all states could be taxed on the whole of marital income, whatever the wife’s
interest under state law.227 It also meant that if the husband could be taxed on the
whole under the federal income tax, the same was true under the federal estate
tax.228
The immediate aftermath of Robbins provided ominous signs for community
property spouses. First, the Attorney General announced that it was considering
applying Holmes’s dicta to states other than California.229 To help him better
understand the nature of the wife’s interest in community income, he invited
community property representatives “to state their views on the subject” and to file
briefs.230 In 1927, the Attorney General issued his opinion on the subject,

CALIF. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (1926). Commentators questioned the result. See Douglas B.
Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax (pt. 1), 14 CALIF. L. REV. 351,
365–66 (1926) (“Upon what theory may community income, half of the funds comprising
which is owned, under the state decisions, by the wife, be said to be wholly the income of
the husband?”).
224. Maggs (pt. 1), supra note 223, at 368. Legal commentators noted the progovernment features of Holmes’s opinion. See id. at 365 (arguing that the Court’s “position
is that the doctrine of those state courts which hold that the wife is co-proprietor of
community property with her husband is material, and would be followed by the Supreme
Court to the extent of permitting Congress to tax the wife for her interest in the community
income; but is not material, and will not be followed, to the extent of preventing Congress
from taxing the husband for the whole”).
225. Maggs (pt. 2), supra note 223, at 441.
226. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 811.
227. See George Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes—The Recent
History of Pending Questions, 4 WASH. L. REV. 145, 159 (1923) (querying whether Robbins
could be applied to other community property states and concluding that Holmes’s dictum
applied only to California).
228. See Maggs (pt. 1), supra note 223, at 357 n.18 (arguing even if wife received her
half of the community upon husband’s death as survivor rather than heir, “it is doubtful
whether any constitutional objection can be urged against a construction of the federal estate
tax law which would subject it to the tax” (emphasis in original)).
229. Donworth, supra note 227, at 164. George Donworth was a Washington lawyer,
federal district court judge, founding member of Perkins Coie, and counsel for the taxpayer
in Seaborn.
230. Id.
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withdrawing earlier opinions from 1920231 and 1921,232 and concluding that the
“problems presented [could] not be settled by any opinion of the Attorney
General . . .” nor by congressional action.233 Instead, he encouraged the Secretary
of the Treasury “to arrange for test cases in the courts or otherwise deal with the
matter as you may think proper.”234 In addition, the Ninth Circuit overturned its
earlier holding in Blum, finding that a wife in California took her one-half interest
in the community upon the death of her husband as an heir rather than as a
survivor, which properly subjected her interest to federal estate taxes.235 The Ninth
Circuit had already followed Robbins in an earlier case finding a California
husband taxable on the whole of community income and property, including those
portions specifically attributable to his wife’s community earnings.236 Other courts
were also influenced by Robbins in finding that California community property
statutes did not vest sufficient interest in the wife to treat her as co-owner of the
community during marriage.237 Indeed, it appeared as if the federal judiciary was
inching inexorably towards removing the tax benefits associated with community
property law, in California and elsewhere.
A. Control, Beneficial Interests, Enjoyment, and Other Indicia of Ownership
Beneficial interests as well as legal interests evidenced ownership according to
the Court. An expansive, dynamic conception of ownership was particularly
appropriate if it curbed tax avoidance, a problem to which the Court became
increasingly attentive as reports from Treasury and Congress indicated that
noncompliance threatened federal receipts. In an opinion authored by Justice
Holmes, the Court held in 1918 that stock dividends did not constitute income

231. See Income Tax—Cmty. Prop., 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 298 (1920).
232. See Cmty. Prop.—Income and Estate Taxes, 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 435 (1921).
233. Withdrawal of Opinions Relating to the Wife’s Interest in the Community Income,
35 Op. Att’y Gen. 265, 267–68 (1927).
234. Id. at 269. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department’s Division of Tax Research
prepared an administrative ruling prohibiting husbands and wives from dividing community
income on separate returns. Members of Congress from community property states
intervened, and persuaded the Treasury to withhold its ruling pending test cases. See
Memorandum from Mr. Tarlean to Mr. Sullivan (June 10, 1941) (on file in Office of Tax
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Record Group 56, Box 54), available at
http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/marriage/hst28693/28693-1.htm.
235. Talcott v. United States, 23 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1928).
236. See Comm’r v. Roth, 22 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1927); see also Belcher v. Comm’r, 11
B.T.A. 1294 (1928) (holding in absence of an ante-nuptial agreement, the whole of
community earnings taxable solely to the husband). But see Harris v. Comm’r, 10 B.T.A.
1374 (1928) (finding valid written agreement stipulating the wife’s salary as separate
property permitted her to report income separately); Estate of Randall v. Comm’r, 4 B.T.A.
679 (1926) (holding wife domiciled in California entitled to file a separate income tax return
reflecting separate earnings).
237. See, e.g., Hirsch v. United States, 62 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1932); Preston v. Comm’r,
21 B.T.A. 840, 848 (1930) (following Robbins in taxing all community income to husband
whose “dominion and control” were not altered by statutory amendments).
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within contemplation of the federal income tax.238 Two years later, the Supreme
Court reached the same conclusion, but with Holmes dissenting strongly. The
earlier decision interpreted a statute that did not reach the full extent of the
Sixteenth Amendment, which should be read, Holmes urged, “in ‘a sense most
obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption.’”239 “The known
purpose of this Amendment,” he continued, “was to get rid of nice questions as to
what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that most people not lawyers would
suppose when they voted for it that they put a question like the present to rest.”240
Justice Brandeis also reversed course like Holmes, and articulated a considerably
more expansive view of taxable income. “In terse, comprehensive language
befitting the Constitution, [the people] empowered Congress ‘to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.’ They intended to include thereby
everything which by reasonable understanding can fairly be regarded as
income.”241
The broad taxing powers of Congress that the Court articulated in Robbins had
roots in this earlier jurisprudence. As the Court considered taxpayers’ artful
attempts to avoid taxes by shifting legal ownership of income to other individuals
and entities, it adopted nontraditional indicia of ownership that went far beyond
legal title. Control, power, or dominion over income, beneficial interest, equitable
interest, and enjoyment of rights constituent of ownership all justified taxability. In
crafting an expansive definition of income and its ownership, the Court operated
with the “acknowledged purpose of saving the revenue from defeat and preventing
tax avoidance.”242 Its jurisprudence with respect to trusts and assignments is
exemplary.
1. Trusts: Relinquishing Control, Part I
As part of the Revenue Act of 1924, Congress had enacted “revolutionary
innovations” to the taxation of trusts,243 effectively taxing the grantor of certain
trusts on income the grantor never received. One provision taxed the grantor on
income from revocable trusts if the grantor retained “the power to revest in himself
title to any part of the corpus of the trust,”244 while another provision taxed the
grantor on trust income which may be distributed to him, accumulated for future
distribution to him, or used to pay his life insurance premiums.245 Commentators at
the time observed that the provisions amounted to “a statutory application of the
principle of constructive receipt,”246 and that they appropriately addressed

238. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
239. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219–20 (1920) (citation omitted).
240. Id. at 220.
241. Id. at 237.
242. Randolph E. Paul & Valentine B. Havens, Husband and Wife Under the Income
Tax, 5 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 248 (1935).
243. Roswell F. Magill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924: Income Tax Provisions, 24
COLUM. L. REV. 836, 858 (1924).
244. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 219(g), 43 Stat. 253, 277 (1924).
245. Id. § 219(h).
246. Roswell F. Magill, The Taxation of Unrealized Income, 39 HARV. L. REV. 82, 98
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overaggressive tax avoidance.247 Taxpayers, meanwhile, argued that the law was
unconstitutional, amounting to a tax on income that was not legally the grantor’s
but rather that of the trustee (by virtue of the legal estate) or the beneficiary (by
virtue of the equitable interest). The Supreme Court disagreed.
In Corliss v. Bowers,248 the Court considered a revocable trust established by a
husband, with income payable to the wife and remainders to the children. The trust
instrument reserved for the husband the power to revoke, alter, or modify the trust
in whole or in part, and he further retained full control over trust investments.
Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court. “[T]axation is not so much concerned
with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed—
the actual benefit for which the tax is paid.”249 “[I]ncome that is subject to a man’s
unfettered command,” he concluded, “and that he is free to enjoy at his own option
may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.”250 Legal
commentators praised the decision for “preventing tax avoidance,”251 while others
condemned it for violating the taxpayer’s due process by taxing him on another’s
income.252 But the case was a relatively easy one for the Court in that it involved an
unconditional power of revocation in the grantor, evincing “unfettered command”
over income. The harder cases involved situations “where the command was
fettered.”253 Here, too, the Court acted boldly.
In Reinecke v. Smith,254 a grantor husband created trusts for the benefit of his
wife and children. The trustees were the settlor, one of his sons (also the direct
beneficiary of one trust and contingent beneficiary of the others), and a bank. Each
trust authorized the settlor to revoke it with the consent of one additional trustee.
The Court held the settlor taxable on the trust income. “Congress had [this] power,”
Justice Roberts wrote for another unanimous Court, “in order to make the system of
income taxation complete and consistent and to prevent facile evasion of the
law.”255 Trustees owed a duty to manage trusts faithfully, but they were under no
duty to resist alteration or revocation of the trust. In the case at hand, moreover, the
grantor’s command was only restricted by receiving consent from one of two
(1925).
247. See Magill, supra note 243, at 860–61 (opining Treasury was appropriately “seeking
to prevent . . . evasion” in cases where the taxpayer maintains control over income or
property “whether he exercises it or not”).
248. 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
249. Id. at 378.
250. Id.
251. Recent Cases, Taxation—Internal Revenue—Constitutionality of Applying Federal
Estate Tax to Tenancy by Entirety, 15 MINN. L. REV. 130, 131 (1930) [hereinafter Recent
Cases, Taxation]; see also Note, Tax Dodging by the Assignment of Future Income, 40 YALE
L.J. 663, 665 (1931) (calling decision “indicative of a tendency of the federal courts to
nullify devices intended to reduce surtaxes by distributing the income among more than one
recipient”); Recent Cases, Trusts—Constitutionality of Statute Taxing the Settlor for Income
from a Revocable Trust, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 440, 441–42 (1930) [hereinafter Recent Cases,
Trusts] (finding decision “commendable in that it carries out the purpose of the legislature
which was to prevent the evasion of surtaxes by means of estates and trusts”).
252. See Recent Cases, Trusts, supra note 251, at 441.
253. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 819.
254. 289 U.S. 172 (1933).
255. Id. at 178.
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people, neither of whom possessed an interest to withhold consent. “A contrary
decision would make evasion of the tax a simple matter,” the Court said.256 “[I]t
would be easy to select a friend or relative as co-holder of such a power and so
place large amounts of principal and income accruing therefrom beyond the reach
of taxation upon the grantor while he retained to all intents and purposes control of
both.”257 Congress reached a similar conclusion the previous year when it indicated
that a grantor with power to revest title to any part of the trust corpus, “either alone
or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest,” was
required to include all trust income as his own.258 Congress’s power was not
unlimited.259 But where the taxpayer “retains for himself so many of the attributes
of ownership,” he could not claim to be “the victim of despotic power when for the
purpose of taxation he is treated as owner altogether.”260
But what if the taxpayer retained no attributes of ownership? That is, what if the
proceeds of a trust, revocable or irrevocable, went to named beneficiaries, and the
taxpayer retained no power to change the designation of the beneficiaries, revoke
the trust, or in any way exercise control over the trust? The taxpayer could still be
subject to taxation if he received beneficial use of the income. In such a situation,
the Supreme Court required a grantor to include in his taxable income the portion
of trust income applied to the payment of premiums on life insurance policies for
his benefit.261 In Burnet v. Wells, the Supreme Court found that “[l]iability does not
have to rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of all the privileges and benefits
enjoyed by the most favored owner at a given time or place,” nor was the
government “in casting about for proper subjects of taxation . . . confined by the
traditional classification of interests or estates.”262 Indeed, according to the Court,
Congress
may tax not only ownership, but any right or privilege that is a
constituent of ownership. Liability may rest upon the enjoyment by the
taxpayer of privileges and benefits so substantial and important as to
make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he were the owner,
and to tax him on that basis.263
If a taxpayer enjoyed significant enough privileges and benefits from the
disposition of income, it was “reasonable to treat the taxpayer as if he had
ownership of the income or an equivalent of ownership.”264 The value and power
associated with disposing of income was tantamount to ownership.

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 166, 47 Stat. 169, 221 (1932) (emphasis added).
259. See Reinecke v. N. Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929) (invalidating an estate tax levy
where the grantor’s power to revoke was dependent on the acquiescence of a trust
beneficiary who possessed an adverse interest).
260. DuPont v. Comm’r, 289 U.S. 685, 689 (1933).
261. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933) (upholding section 219(h) of the Revenue
Acts of 1924 and 1926).
262. Id. at 678.
263. Id. (citation omitted).
264. Developments in the Law, supra note 222, at 1277. Similarly, if a husband created a
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2. Assignments: Relinquishing Control, Part II
The Supreme Court’s treatment of assignments of income and property
paralleled that of its trust jurisprudence. As with trusts, when future payments were
assigned, “the assignor is merely exercising in advance his control over them,”265
and “the enjoyment and benefit derived by a person from the payments to an
intended beneficiary is taxable income” to the assignor.266 The taxpayer was treated
as having constructively received the assigned income and taxed as if he had
actually received it. “This constructive receipt is just as effective for tax purposes
as actual receipt of the income by the assignor.”267 Also as with trusts, the Court’s
approach to the cases involved its “fear of tax avoidance.”268 The Court inquired as
to whether “a sufficient quantum of rights has flowed from assignor to assignee to
bring about a shift in the taxable person.”269
This inquiry was particularly difficult in the context of the family, where “the
intimate relationship of husband and wife sometimes enables the consummation of
transactions perfect in form, but wholly lacking in substance.”270 The Court was
aware of the heightened opportunity to avoid tax in the family setting.271 A
disproportionate number of assignment cases involved intrafamily transactions,
including assignments of partnership interests,272 trust estates,273 rents,274
trust for the benefit of his wife pursuant to a separation agreement or to enable the wife to
pay household expenses during marriage, the husband was taxable as a beneficiary of the
trust in satisfaction of a legal obligation. See Turner v. Comm’r, 28 B.T.A. 91 (1933); Welch
v. Comm’r, 12 B.T.A. 800 (1928); Van Brunt v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 406 (1928).
265. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 828.
266. Id.
267. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 244 (emphasis in original).
268. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 793; see also Recent Decisions,
Taxation—Income Tax—Partnership of Husband and Wife, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1081
(1932) (observing that assignment cases “have probably been conditioned by their
background of bad faith”).
269. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 796 (emphasis in original).
270. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 255. “‘Bed chamber’ arrangements,” Paul and
Havens observed, “are difficult to prove or disprove, and diligence is necessary where tax
avoidance is easy.” Id. at 264.
271. See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677 (1933) (“The solidarity of the family is to
make it possible for the taxpayer to surrender title to another and to keep dominion for
himself, or if not technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment.”); Kunau v.
Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 509, 512 (1933) (recognizing the “necessity for close scrutiny of
transactions between persons related by blood, marriage, or community of interest in order to
be sure that their dealings are in fact what they, on face, purport to be as to their validity,
effect and finality”).
272. See, e.g., Balkwill v. Comm’r, 77 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1935) (holding the assignor
partner-sibling taxable rather than the assignee brothers and sisters); Rosevear v. Comm’r,
31 B.T.A. 146 (1934) (holding the assignor husband-partner taxable on distributed earnings
rather than the assignee wife).
273. See, e.g., McDonald v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (same, assignor
husband/assignee wife); Brewster v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 686 (Ct. Cl. 1935) (holding
the assignor sibling taxable rather than the assignee sibling).
274. See, e.g., Bing v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) (holding the assignor son
taxable rather than the assignee mother), aff’d, 26 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1928); Woods v.
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securities,275 and commissions on insurance premiums.276 And while ownership of
income continued to determine taxability, the rule did not necessarily mean that
“rights will not be contrasted and balanced, and income allocated on vague
principles of equity and fairness.”277 State law continued to define property as well
as who owned it, but federal law determined its taxability. As the Supreme Court
phrased it in Burnet v. Harmel, “The state law creates legal interests, but the federal
statute determines when and how they shall be taxed.”278 In rendering decisions in
the assignment cases, the Supreme Court continued to embrace incidents of
ownership broader than those recognized by the states. In the process, it also
continued to protect Congress’s broad taxing powers.
In Burnet v. Leininger, the Court held that an assignment of partnership interests from
a husband to wife without a change in partnership documents or ownership interests did
not defeat taxation of the husband on distributed partnership earnings.279 In language
reminiscent of Robbins that Congress could levy tax on the basis of control, a unanimous
Court said, “If it be assumed that Mrs. Leininger became the beneficial owner of one-half
of the income which her husband received from the firm enterprise, it is still true that he,
and not she, was the member of the firm and that she had only a derivative interest.”280
Assigning his partnership interest was not the same as transferring “the corpus of the
partnership property to a new firm with a consequent readjustment of rights in that
property and management.”281 As legal commentators noted at the time, “a partner must
transfer a ‘share’ in the partnership as well as profits earned upon such share” to avoid
tax.282 Assignment of “profits” alone did not relieve the assignor of the tax,283 nor did
merely assigning “interest” in the firm.284 Similarly, assignment of unearned future
income, by itself, did not free the assignor from tax on that income,285 nor did an
Comm’r, 5 B.T.A. 413, 415–16 (1926) (holding the assignor father-husband taxable rather
than the assignees wife and daughter).
275. See, e.g., Van Brunt v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 406 (1928) (holding the assignor
husband taxable, not the assignee wife); Le Blanc v. Comm’r, 7 B.T.A. 256, 259 (1927)
(holding the assignor father-employer taxable not the assignee son-employee).
276. See, e.g., Parker v. Routzahn, 56 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1932) (holding the assignor
husband taxable on future commissions rather than the assignee wife); Bishop v. Comm’r,
54 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1931) (same).
277. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 796.
278. 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
279. 285 U.S. 136 (1932). But see Rose v. Comm’r, 65 F.2d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 1933)
(holding the declaration of a trust of partnership interests and properties sufficient to relieve
the partner husband-father from tax on grounds that the trustee family members received
“rights of partners”).
280. Leininger, 285 U.S. at 141.
281. Id.
282. Current Decisions, Income Taxation—Assignment of Partnership Profits, 41 YALE
L.J. 925, 926 (1932).
283. See, e.g., Harris v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1930); Rossmore v. Anderson, 1 F.
Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
284. See, e.g., Battleson v. Comm’r, 62 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1932); Balkwill v. Comm’r, 25
B.T.A. 1147 (1932) (holding the distributive share of the partnership income taxable to the
partner, despite the declaration of trust with respect to the beneficiaries).
285. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (holding the assignor husband taxable
on the assignment of future earnings); Bing v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1927)
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assignment of income already earned.286 Control of income and its taxability involved
both “the right to demand or obtain the income and the right to control it after it has been
received.”287 If the assignor retained both these rights, he was taxable on the income
when it accrued.288 Conversely, if the assignor relinquished both rights in an irrevocable
assignment, he was no longer taxable on the income.289
More than anything, an effective assignment required the assignor to relinquish
control, not only over the income stream, but over the source of the income and any
beneficial enjoyment over the income.290 Thus, taxpayers could not assign income
from a spendthrift trust because, by law, they controlled neither the income nor the
trust corpus.291 An effective assignment of profits from the sale of property
required relinquishing control over the entire property prior to the sale.292 An
assignor had to assign the contract and not just income from the contract.293 He had
to transfer the corpus (i.e. tangible property),294 a property right (i.e. covering
contract rights broader than property transfers),295 more than a mere promise,296 and
(holding the assignor son taxable on the mere promise to pay future income to his mother),
aff’d, 26 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1928).
286. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Comm’r, 63 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1933) (holding the husband
taxable on an assignment to his wife of undivided one-half interest in contingent fee for
which he had fully performed).
287. Recent Cases, Taxation, supra note 251, at 129.
288. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bowers, 9 F.2d 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) (holding the husband
partner taxable on partnership profits assigned to his wife who had no present interest in the
partnership assets), aff’d, 15 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1926).
289. See, e.g., Rosenwald v. Comm’r, 33 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding the husband
not taxable on the assignment of negotiable bond coupons on grounds he divested himself of
all control, while holding him taxable on assigned stock dividends, interest on a note, and
rents from real property that he still controlled).
290. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Field, 42 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding the assignor
husband not taxable on the assignment of trust income to his beneficiary wife on grounds
that he effectively transferred his equitable estate); Clark v. Comm’r, 16 B.T.A. 453 (1929)
(holding the assignment alienating equitable life interest as a valid transfer of present
property right to assignees sufficient to make them taxable on future income).
291. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Blair, 60 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1932) (holding the beneficiary of
spendthrift trust taxable on assignments of trust income). Such trusts are for the benefit of
persons unable to control their own spending.
292. See, e.g., Wright v. Comm’r, 26 B.T.A. 21 (1932) (holding the assignee taxable on a
pre-sale transfer of an undivided one-half interest in property); Rogers v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A.
638 (1929) (holding the assignor taxable on profits from a sale of property assigned after the
sale transaction); Walker v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1142 (1927) (holding the assignment of an oil
and gas lease from a husband to his wife an effective transfer of the husband’s interest).
293. See Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1932); Hall v. Burnet, 54 F.2d 443
(D.C. Cir. 1931).
294. See, e.g., Van Brunt v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 406 (1928) (assigning rental and
dividend income from property not corpus); Parshall v. Comm’r, 7 B.T.A. 318 (1927)
(holding the husband’s transfer of partnership interest to his wife sufficient to make a
subsequent partnership distribution taxable to her).
295. See, e.g., Leydig v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 124, 132 (1929) (finding “where the thing
assigned was a property right, real or personal, productive of income, income thereafter
arising from such property is income to the assignee by virtue of his ownership”).
296. See, e.g., Bing v. Bowers, 22 F.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) (emphasizing the difference
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a right to collect income as well as to exercise interest in the property generating
the income.297 If the assignor failed to divest himself of all legal, equitable, and
beneficial interests in income and its sources, he still enjoyed sufficient control to
justify taxing him on the subject of the assignment.
3. Income as Consumption and Control as Ownership
By viewing control as tantamount to ownership, the Court defined the reach of
the income tax in a way that was more appropriate for defining income under a
consumption tax. Cases like Burnet v. Wells,298 Reinecke v. Smith,299 DuPont v.
Commissioner,300 and Burnet v. Leininger301 all moved the income tax “close to a
‘services’ or ‘flow of satisfactions’ concept of income—the enjoyment and benefit
derived by a person from the payments to an intended beneficiary is taxable income
to the former.”302 Taxable income under this theory tracked not only increases and
decreases in wealth but also increases and decreases in the value of personal
satisfaction.303 In many ways, the Court’s expanding conception of income
resembled what modern-day theorists would recognize as the Haig-Simons
definition. Named for its two most influential proponents, economists Robert Haig
and Henry Simons, the definition considered income as the algebraic sum of “the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and the change in the value of the
store of property rights.”304 “Personal income,” Simons wrote more pointedly,
“connotes, broadly, the exercise of control over the use of society’s scarce
resources.”305
Some commentators at the time expressed concern that this “broad and
convenient formula” for income could “dangerously stimulate the appetite and
imagination of hungry income tax collectors.”306 Several members of the Supreme
Court were similarly worried that a definition of taxable income untethered to

between a mere promise to pay and an effective transfer of a property right); Colbert v.
Comm’r, 12 B.T.A. 565 (1928) (same).
297. See, e.g., Rose v. Comm’r, 65 F.2d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 1933) (finding that an
assignment from husband-partner to assignee family members transferred a right to
partnership income as well as “rights of partners”); Parshall, 7 B.T.A. at 318 (finding the
assignee wife received a right to partnership income as well as partnership interests).
298. 289 U.S. 670 (1933).
299. 289 U.S. 172 (1933).
300. 289 U.S. 685, 689 (1933).
301. 285 U.S. 136 (1932).
302. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 828 (citation omitted).
303. See Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 253 (“[N]ew development of constructive or
equivalent-of-cash income is but a short step to the ‘flow-of-satisfaction’ concept of income,
to the doctrine that personal satisfaction is alone sufficient to constitute the equivalent of
cash.”).
304. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (numbering omitted); see also Robert Murray Haig,
The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
305. SIMONS, supra note 304, at 49.
306. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 253.
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ownership as defined by legal title inappropriately broadened the powers of
taxation. Justice Sutherland, for one, opined that taxing a grantor
requires something more tangible than a purpose to perform a social
duty, or the recognition of a moral claim as distinguished from a legal
obligation, which, we think, is not supplied by an assumption of his
desire thereby to secure his own peace of mind and happiness or relieve
himself from further concern in the matter.307
While Congress enjoyed broad taxing powers, “the distinction between taxation
and confiscation must still be observed.”308 In its zeal to protect the revenue, the
Court may have blurred the line.
A definition of income that equated control with ownership raised a
constitutional concern involving due process under the Fifth Amendment. In the
words of Justice Sutherland, “So long as the Fifth Amendment remains unrepealed
and is permitted to control, Congress may not tax the property of A as the property
of B, or the income of A as the income of B” on grounds that B controls A’s
property or income.309 The Supreme Court first considered this issue under the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifth Amendment. In Hoeper v. Tax
Commission,310 a married taxpayer protested taxes paid under the Wisconsin state
income tax, which computed tax liability by aggregating spouses’ incomes on a
single return. A divided Court struck down the Wisconsin statute on grounds that
the husband had no legal interest in his wife’s income nor did he control it under
the state’s reformed common law. The Court held:
We have no doubt that, because of the fundamental conceptions which
underlie our system, any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one
person’s property or income by reference to the property or income of
another is contrary to due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. That which is not in fact the taxpayer’s
income cannot be made such by calling it income.311
The Court applied the same reasoning to a case arising under the Fifth Amendment,
finding that both “in law and in fact the wife’s income was her separate property,” a
separation of interests which prevented the government from taxing her income as
her husband’s.312 Without legal title or control over the wife’s income, it could not
be said that the husband owned in any sense—legal, equitable, beneficial—a
taxable property right.

307. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 683 (1933) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
311. Id. at 215.
312. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932) (involving the federal gift tax and
finding the “situation presented in the Hoeper case . . . the same as that presented here”).
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Three dissenting justices in Hoeper saw control where state law did not.
“Taxation may consider not only command over, but actual enjoyment of, the
property taxed,” Justice Holmes wrote for himself, Brandeis, and Stone.313
In some States, if not in all, the husband became the owner of the
wife’s chattels, on marriage, without any trouble from the Constitution;
and it would require ingenious argument to show that there might not
be a return to the law as it was in 1800. It is all a matter of statute. But
for statute, the income taxed would belong to the husband, and there
would be no question about it.314
The majority’s emphasis on “separation of interests” as between the spouses
“cannot make us deaf to the assumption . . . of community when two spouses live
together and when usually each would get the benefit of the income of each without
inquiry into the source.”315 Regardless of the spouses’ statutory interests under
Wisconsin’s or any other state’s property law, husbands and wives operated as a
family unit and benefitted from each other’s income. The reality of that shared
enjoyment and use justified taxing combined family income to either spouse.316
Under the prevailing gendered view of the family and its common law roots, the
husband should bear the burden. Taxing combined family income was also justified
“by its tendency to prevent tax evasion.”317 Although “the law and the evil” had to
share a just and reasonable relation to pass constitutional muster, the Court had
regularly held “that administrative necessity may justify the inclusion of innocent
objects or transactions within a prohibited class.”318 Preventing tax avoidance and
accounting for the realities of family economics justified aggregating family
income and taxing it as a unit.
VI. POE V. SEABORN: OWNERSHIP UNDER STATE PROPERTY LAW
GOVERNS TAXABILITY
Holmes’s expansive definition of income went on trial in 1930. Three years
earlier, the Attorney General encouraged the Treasury Department “to arrange for
test cases” to determine the nature of the wife’s interest under community property

313. Hoeper, 284 U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 219–20.
316. See Recent Decisions, Taxation—Power to Determine Income Tax Rate of Husband
on Basis of Combined Income of Husband and Wife, 30 MICH. L. REV. 810, 811 (1932)
(observing in context of Hoeper, “family continues to operate as a unit and the property and
income of all its members are still pooled for the benefit of all, regardless of where the legal
title stands”). Other commentators argued that taxing someone on the income of another was
justified under a control theory or constructive receipt. See Magill, supra note 243, at 860–
61. Still others noted “[t]here would seem to be no constitutional objections to taxing the use
of income rather than the income itself.” Notes, Federal Taxation of Income as Affected by
Community Ownership, 39 HARV. L. REV. 762, 765 (1926).
317. Hoeper, 284 U.S. at 220.
318. Id. at 220–21.
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law and to further determine the proper tax treatment of that interest.319 By 1930,
test cases had percolated up to the highest court.
In the lead case, Poe v. Seaborn,320 the Supreme Court interpreted the Revenue
Act of 1926 as applied to the interests of husband and wife in community property
under the law of Washington. The opinion, authored by Justice Roberts, challenged
definitions of taxable income that deviated from strict legal title. The relevant
federal income tax provisions “lay a tax upon the net income of every individual,”
and “use of the word ‘of’ denotes ownership. It would be a strained construction,
which, in the absence of further definition by Congress, should impute a broader
significance to the phrase.”321 The wife’s ownership interest in community
property, in turn, “must be found in the provisions of the law of the State.”322
According to the government, the husband under Washington law enjoyed “such
broad powers of control and alienation, that while the community lasts, he is
essentially the owner of the whole community property, and ought so to be
considered” for tax purposes.323 The Court disagreed, finding that while the
husband was relegated to powers of management and control over community
personal property, his power was “subject to restrictions which are inconsistent
with denial of the wife’s interest as co-owner.”324 The “community must act
through an agent,” not just to discourage litigation between spouses which might
“subvert the marital relation,” but also to protect the reliance and expectancy
interests of third parties dealing with one or the other spouse.325 Most importantly,
a careful review of Washington’s community property statutes and state decisions
interpreting them indicated that the wife possessed a “clear” and “vested property
right in the community property, equal with that of her husband.”326
The Court’s decision was a definitive blow to the position that control
determined ownership. “Power is not synonymous with right,” the Court
asserted.327 Control could be indicative of ownership but not determinative. In fact,
under Washington law, the husband’s control as managing agent of the community
“was but a recognition of the ownership of another.”328 “The law’s investiture of
the husband with broad powers, by no means negatives the wife’s present interest
as co-owner.”329 Under the law of Washington, “the entire property and income of
the community can no more be said to be that of the husband, than it could rightly
be termed that of the wife.”330 Thus, married couples in Washington could file

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
282 U.S. 101 (1930).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111–12.
Id. at 110–12.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 113.
Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 828 n.147.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 113.
Id.
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separate returns, “each treating one-half of the community income as his or her
respective income.”331
The Court held similarly in the companion cases accompanying Seaborn. It
found that the community property laws of Arizona,332 Louisiana,333 and Texas334
granted wives in those states present vested interests equal to their husbands in onehalf the community income and property. The equal ownership interests between
spouses in those states permitted them to file separate federal income tax returns
each with one-half the community income.
In addition, by way of certificate from the Ninth Circuit, the Court revisited the
nature of the wife’s interest under California community property law. In United
States v. Malcolm,335 the Court considered two questions: (i) under the federal
income tax, “must the entire community income of a husband and wife domiciled
in California be returned and the income tax thereon be paid by the husband?”;336
and (ii) did a wife in California possess “such an interest in the community income
that she should separately report and pay tax on one-half of such income?”337
California law had changed since the Court last considered these questions.
Prompted by the adverse decisions in Robbins338 and Stewart v. Stewart,339 the
California legislature had enacted a statute identifying the “respective interests of
husband and wife in community property” during marriage as “present, existing,
and equal.”340 The Supreme Court considered the above questions in light of the
legislative declaration.341 Citing Seaborn and its companion cases, the Malcolm
Court found, first, that a California husband did not have to report the entire
community income on his own return, and second, that a California wife possessed
sufficient interest in the community to report one-half the community income on a
return separate from her husband’s.342 Shortly thereafter, the Treasury Department
issued a ruling that applied the holdings in Seaborn, Malcolm, and the companion
cases to the remaining three community property states of Idaho, Nevada, and New
Mexico.343 By the close of 1931, married couples residing in all eight community

331. Id. at 118.
332. See Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 121 (1930).
333. See Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 131 (1930).
334. See Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 126–27 (1930).
335. 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
336. Id. at 793.
337. Id. at 794.
338. United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
339. 249 P. 197, 206 (1926) (concluding that the legislature “did not state . . .‘in plain
language,’ . . . ‘that the purpose of these amendments was to vest in the wife during the
marriage a present interest or estate in the community property’” (emphasis added in second
quote)).
340. Act of April 28, 1927, ch. 265, § 1, 1927 Cal. Stat. 484; see also William M.
Simmons, The Interest of a Wife in California Community Property, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 404,
417 (1934).
341. Some commentators argued that the 1927 amendments simply clarified longstanding
policy and law. See, e.g., Recent Legislation, Community Property, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 68
(1927).
342. Malcolm, 282 U.S. at 793–94.
343. I.R.S., I.R.B., MIMEOGRAPH 3853 139–40 C.B. X, pt. 1.
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property states reported income for federal income tax purposes as co-owners of
marital income and property.
***
In the same year that the Supreme Court decided Seaborn, it heard another
seminal tax case, Lucas v. Earl.344 Both cases involved the taxation of married
couples living in community property states. But while the Washington spouses in
Seaborn were found to share equal ownership interests in the community and
therefore allowed to file separate federal income tax returns, the Earls, residents of
California, were not. In 1901, Mr. and Mrs. Earl contracted to divide equally all
present and future income and property.345 Thirty years later, the Court considered
the tax implications of Mr. Earl’s contractual assignment of personal service
income to his wife. Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court, holding that the
assignment did not relieve Mr. Earl of his responsibility to pay tax on the whole of
his income.346 In language reminiscent of Corliss’s “refinements of title,”347
Holmes said that the case was “not to be decided by attenuated subtleties.”348
Rather, it turned on
the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no
doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and
provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements
and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when
paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.349
Holmes concluded famously: “[N]o distinction can be taken according to the
motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew.”350 Artifice did not relieve the owner of income
from his tax obligations.
Legal commentators at the time debated whether the Court’s subsequent
decision in Seaborn overruled Earl.351 But the Court itself distinguished the cases.
The very assignment in [Earl] was bottomed on the fact that the
earnings would be the husband’s property, else there would have been
nothing on which it could operate. That case presents quite a different
question from this, because here, by law, the earnings are never the
property of the husband, but that of the community.352

344. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
345. Id. at 113–14.
346. Id. at 113–15.
347. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
348. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114.
349. Id. at 114–15.
350. Id. at 115.
351. See, e.g., Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 813 (“As far as
community property is concerned, Lucas v. Earl has been overruled by Poe v. Seaborn.”).
352. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930).
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In other words, Earl was not a community property case, but rather a contract case.
In the context of contract law, the tree that bore the fruit was Mr. Earl, while in the
context of community property law, the tree was the community, comprised equally
of husband and wife. Earl stands for the proposition that one cannot avoid tax by
assigning income to a third party who does not already own the income. Seaborn,
on the other hand, says that husbands in community property states own just onehalf the community income in the first place, and thus owe tax only on their
respective halves. I tell my students to think of it like this: in Earl, 100% of family
income flowed from Mr. Earl’s employer to Mr. Earl and then, a nanosecond later
by virtue of state contract law, 50% of the income passed to Mrs. Earl;
comparatively, in Seaborn, and by virtue of general property law rather than private
contract law, 100% of the income flowed to the community in which both Mr. and
Mrs. Seaborn enjoyed equal, 50% ownership interests. Ownership in Seaborn
“spr[u]ng by operation of law,” while that in Earl was created “by agreement of the
parties.”353
One could argue this view amounts to a distinction without a difference.354 That
is, whether by operation of law or by private agreement, both shift ownership of
income and property, both are initiated voluntarily by the parties, and both, if
validated, result in lower tax liability. The Supreme Court, however, viewed the
distinction between income shifting by general law versus private law as real and
meaningful. Moreover, the difference had nothing to do with whether a marriage
contract was more or less sacred than contracts governing market-based
transactions. It involved ownership, and it applied as equally to community income
as to separate income, to community property spouses as to common law spouses.
Husbands and wives in community property states were co-owners of the
community, but they enjoyed distinct ownership interests, as distinct and separate
as the ownership interests of husbands and wives in common law states.
As Randolph Paul, the “architect of the modern federal tax system,”355 wrote in the
aftermath of Seaborn, “For income tax purposes a husband and wife are, generally
speaking, separate persons. This is true in community property states, and is equally true
in non-community property states.”356 Thus, income shifting by private contract, in both
community property and common law states, reshuffled ownership interests and
qualified as a taxable event. Income shifting by community property law, from husband
to wife or from wife to husband, did not reshuffle ownership interests nor constitute a
taxable event, because neither husband nor wife had more than one-half of the whole to
shift. In Seaborn, the Court acknowledged this fundamental characteristic of community
property law and of family taxation. In no uncertain terms, it held that ownership was the
lodestar of family taxability.

353. See Recent Decisions, supra note 268, at 1081.
354. See, e.g., Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 813 (noting Seaborn
“interposes the community ownership between the salary and the earner, so that the salary is
diverted to the community. It may be urged that an assignment creating enforceable rights in
the assignee to the assignor’s salary should similarly be interposed between the earner and
his salary”).
355. Joseph J. Thorndike, Profiles in History: Randolph E. Paul, 105 TAX NOTES 529,
529 (2004).
356. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 243.

2011]

SAVING SEABORN

1507

VII. FROM LODESTAR TO LEGAL FICTION
In the aftermath of Seaborn, family tax issues did not disappear from the Court’s
docket. Nor did taxpayers slacken their solicitude for tax saving devices. In fact, the
stakes for achieving tax avoidance went up nearly every year in the period between
Seaborn and the end of World War II. The Revenue Act of 1932 raised the top
marginal income tax rate from 25 to 63% and the top estate tax rate from 20 to
45%.357 The new law had the effect of doubling the effective tax rate on the richest
1% of households, from 3.4% to 6.8%.358 It also raised tax avoidance stakes for
middle-income and upper-middle-income taxpayers, transforming what had been a
class-based income tax into a mass-based regime.359 In particular, it lowered
personal exemptions for single as well as married taxpayers,360 and raised tax rates
throughout the middle-income range.361 But that was just the beginning. Congress
upped taxes again in 1934 and 1935, and almost every year between 1940 and
1944. By war’s end, the top marginal rate reached a staggering 94% while personal
exemptions plummeted to $500 for singles and $1000 for married couples.362
As the value of tax avoidance went up, so did tax litigation. By 1940, federal tax
matters constituted “the largest group of cases by subject matter on the [Supreme]
Court’s docket.”363 In the 1940 term, the Court decided an astonishing thirty-four
tax cases364 and an equally high number (twenty-four) by historical standards one

357. Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, 174–77, 243–44 (1932).
358. Brownlee, supra note 32, at 51.
359. See generally Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in
the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1988).
360. See Revenue Act of 1932, at 184.
361. See id. at 174.
362. TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 103, 116 (Sumeet
Sagoo ed., 38th ed. 2005). Lower exemptions pulled millions of Americans into the federal
income tax system. Indeed, between 1939 and 1943, the number of income tax filers jumped
from 4 million to 43 million. Christopher J. Tassava, The American Economy During World
War II, EH.NET (Feb. 5, 2010, 11:19), available at http://eh.net/encyclopedia/
article/tassava.WWII. By war’s end, the broad-based progressive federal income tax
accounted for a near majority of all federal receipts. See TAX FOUND., supra, at 85 (showing
that in 1945 the personal income tax accounted for 41% of federal receipts while the
personal and corporate income taxes combined for 76% of all federal receipts).
363. Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some
Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 779 (1941) [hereinafter Surrey,
The Supreme Court].
364. Id. at 780. The Court sided with the government in twenty-seven of the thirty-four
cases. Id.
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year earlier.365 Taxation, law professor Roswell Magill observed, was “by all odds
the chief matter of concern of the Court.”366
To counteract the avoidance efforts that produced litigation, the Supreme Court
articulated an expansive definition of income and of ownership under the federal
taxing power. Observers were keenly aware of the trend. “The present Court,”
Stanley Surrey wrote in 1941, “has already indicated that the steady broadening of
the concept of income which characterized the past decade will continue, but at a
pace so accelerated that it almost dwarfs the progress of that decade.”367 Others
noted the Court’s increased willingness to explore the outer reaches of Congress’s
taxing power rather than the four corners of statutes as written. In more and more
cases, the “broad sweep” of what constituted gross income “was construed to
indicate Congressional purpose to use the full measure of the taxing power.”368
Quite consciously, the Court “resorted to sweeping theoretical observations to
prevent the obvious escape from the surtax.”369 “While it is true that economic gain
is not always taxable as income,” the Court wrote in Helvering v. Bruun, “it is
settled that the realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an
asset.”370 “Economic gain” occurred whenever an asset appreciated in value, and
the Constitution provided few restrictions on when the government could tax that
appreciation. Determining when it was appropriate to levy a tax had to be framed
“in practical terms and must be shaped by considerations of administrative
convenience and taxpayer convenience. A constitutional strait-jacket imposed by
the Court would not be conducive to such an answer.”371 In the face of aggressive
tax avoidance behavior, “[l]egislative ingenuity need not be the sole response to
taxpayer ingenuity.”372
Judicial resourcefulness was also necessary to protect the revenue, particularly
with respect to family taxation. When analyzing the Court’s family tax

365. Roswell Magill, The Supreme Court on Federal Taxation, 1939–40, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (1940). To put the number of cases in historical perspective, consider that the
Court decided only twenty-four federal tax cases between 2000 and 2010. See United States
Law Week’s Supreme Court Today: Topical List of Cases Decided, BNA,
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/lwt.nsf/TopicalCasesDecided?OpenView&Start=1&Count=100&
Expand=63#63.
366. Magill, supra note 365, at 1.
367. Surrey, The Supreme Court, supra note 363, at 781.
368. Edmund W. Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution of
the Clifford Doctrine, 51 YALE L.J. 213, 213–14 (1941). Legal scholars noted the Court’s
constitutional rather than statutory approach. See Magill, supra note 365, at 2 (asking
whether “the Court [should] attempt to do in some cases what Congress failed to do—seek to
obviate avoidance by holding the income taxable to the settlor by a judicially enacted
exception to the general rule”); George E. Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and
Revocable Trusts, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1322, 1341 (1940) (noting “while there has been no real
slackening in the pace of the taxpayer [to avoid taxes], Congress has been inactive,” and “the
courts have taken over more and more the burden of protecting the revenue”).
369. Surrey, The Supreme Court, supra note 363, at 791.
370. 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940) (holding lessor taxable on the value of a building erected
by lessee in the year of lessee’s default rather than upon lessor’s disposition of the property).
371. Surrey, The Supreme Court, supra note 363, at 792.
372. Id. at 810.
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jurisprudence, one had to “sharply differentiate the statutory and constitutional
aspects. What the statute provides is one thing; what the statute may or can provide,
under the Constitution, is another thing.”373 Ownership remained the guidepost for
analysis, and the Court continued to rely on incidents of ownership beyond strict
legal title to frame a broad definition of taxability. “Technical considerations,” the
Court warned in its most famous trust case, Helvering v. Clifford, “niceties of the
law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may
construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue,” which in
the case at hand involved “the normal consequences of family solidarity.”374 In
Clifford and other family tax cases, observers noted that the Court was “firmly
insisting that the realities of the situation must not be forgotten in the confusion of
technical arguments. In each case the reality” of the taxpayer’s position reflected an
attempt to avoid tax “by a transaction having no substance in itself and deriving its
meaning only from the effort at tax reduction.”375
Adhering to the letter of the law did not guarantee validation by the Court.376
The family unit provided far too many avenues of escape for the Court to accept a
taxpayer’s transaction at face value. In Clifford, the applicable statute said that
income from a trust was taxable to beneficiaries if distributable, taxable to the trust
if not distributable, but never taxable to the grantor.377 The Court largely ignored
this directive, and examined the transaction under Congress’s taxing power. The
question was not whether the taxpayer fit into the form of the trust statutes, but
“whether the grantor after the trust has been established may still be treated, under
this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus.”378 The answer to the question
required “special scrutiny of the arrangement,” particularly “where the grantor is
the trustee and the beneficiaries are members of his family group . . . lest what is in
reality but one economic unit be multiplied into two or more.”379 Under its
sweeping analysis, the Court found “at best a temporary reallocation of income
within an intimate family group. Since the income remains in the family and since
the husband retains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance

373. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 241. Defining taxable income, the Court
acknowledged, involved “the boundaries of legislative power. It must be dealt with in a large
way, as questions of due process always are, not narrowly or pedantically, in slavery to
forms or phrases.” Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677–78 (1933).
374. 309 U.S. 331, 334, 337 (1940). One year later, the Court noted that it had long
prevented “form to obscure the reality” of transactions. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579,
583 (1941).
375. Surrey, Assignments of Income, supra note 197, at 803; see also Magill, supra note
365, at 19 (“The taxpayer cannot count on a close technical interpretation; if his case is
within the general spirit of the taxing sections, as the Court views it, he will be held
liable . . . .”).
376. This was also true in areas extending beyond family taxation. See, e.g., Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (disallowing losses from sales of securities to taxpayer’s whollyowned corporation); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (requiring reorganization to
have a business purpose to qualify for tax-free treatment).
377. See 309 U.S. 331 (holding grantor husband, rather than beneficiary wife, taxable on
income from short-term trust).
378. Id. at 334.
379. Id. at 335.
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that the trust will not effect any substantial change in his economic position.”380 In
similar fashion, the Court looked beyond the statute and probed the outer reaches of
the Sixteenth Amendment in holding the grantor taxable in cases involving trusts
established for the payment of alimony,381 the support of minor children,382 and the
satisfaction of debts.383 Control over income, enjoyment in the power of its
disposition, and satisfaction in delivering it to intended recipients also guided the
Court in taxing donors on gifts of interest-bearing coupons384 and assignorbeneficiaries on assignments of trust income.385
Under its expansive definition of ownership, the Court could choose whomever
to give the “shaft.”386 The assignee of future salary payments was taxable due to an
increase in wealth as the new owner, while the assignor was taxable as the old
owner enjoying the power of disposition. Similarly, in the context of divided
property interests, the grantor/assignor/donor could be taxed if he actually received
the income as well as if he enjoyed disposing of it in satisfaction of some other
obligation, while the beneficiary/assignee/donee could be taxed as the new owner
of income-bearing property. Faced with taxpayers’ insatiable appetite for tax
avoidance, the Court relied on a mix of statutory, constitutional, and philosophical
arguments to protect the revenue.
A. Politics of Tax Avoidance and Taxing the Family
Meanwhile, the Treasury Department was busy prosecuting its own antiavoidance war. It received inspiration from President Franklin Roosevelt, who
railed against tax “loopholes” that provided an “unfair advantage [to] the few.”387

380. Id. at 335–36. Commentators noted the importance of “control” in determining
ownership of income and, in turn, of taxability. See, e.g., Pavenstedt, supra note 368, at 230
(noting “quantum of control” as “the all-important—and perhaps, it may be ventured, the
solely decisive—factor when considering” taxability).
381. See, e.g., Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 10 (1935) (finding “no warrant for a
construction [of the statutes] which would preclude the laying of the tax against the one who
through the discharge of his obligation enjoys the benefit of the income as though he had
personally received it”). But see Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940) (holding the grantor
husband not taxable on income from an alimony trust where the trust discharged his duty of
support). Cf. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940) (holding the grantor husband taxable
on the income from an alimony trust where the state granting the divorce retained the power
to modify the divorce decree).
382. See, e.g., Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U.S. 551 (1935) (mem.) (per curiam);
Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U.S. 551 (1935) (mem.) (per curiam).
383. See, e.g., Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U.S. 552 (1935).
384. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1940) (“[The] power to dispose of
income is the equivalent of ownership of it.”); see also Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122,
124 (1940) (holding the assignor husband taxable on an assignment to his wife of renewal
insurance commissions payable in the future).
385. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 581–82 (1941) (holding the assignor
mother taxable on income assigned to her children from a trust of which she was the
beneficiary).
386. See United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315, 328 (1925).
387. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message to the Congress on Tax Revision, in 4 PUBLIC
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Tax avoidance was as bad as tax evasion. “‘Tax avoidance’ means you hire a
$250,000-fee lawyer,” Roosevelt said, “and he changes the word ‘evasion’ into the
word ‘avoidance.’”388 Both were “inequitable and undemocratic,” and both had
been getting worse.389 In 1937, after persuading the tax-writing committees in
Congress to create a Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Roosevelt
argued that avoidance and evasion had become “so widespread and so amazing
both in their boldness and their ingenuity, that further action without delay seems
imperative.”390 Invoking the words of recently deceased Justice Holmes, Roosevelt
wrote to Congress: “‘Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.’ Too many
individuals, however, want the civilization at a discount.”391
Roosevelt’s Treasury Department identified eleven “principal devices” used by
taxpayers “with large incomes for the purpose of defeating the income taxes.”392
Chief among them were three techniques to shift income within the family: trusts,
partnerships, and community property law, the last of which Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau called “unjustifiable.”393 All told, $193 million ($2.97 billion in
2011 dollars) in tax revenue was lost annually to separate returns: $159 million
($2.44 billion) from income shifting among common law spouses and another $34
million ($522 million) from community property couples.394 As a solution to the
revenue loss, the Treasury recommended that Congress enact compulsory joint
returns, requiring spouses wherever resident to aggregate family income on a single
return with tax liability apportioned according to spouses’ respective earned
income shares.395 Congress took no action on the recommendation,396 but Treasury
pushed ahead in crafting solutions to family tax avoidance.
Beginning in the mid-1930s, the Treasury Department devoted considerable
time to studying family taxation. In the process, it adopted a holistic approach,
seeking a solution involving all separate returns and not just those filed by

PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 270, 271 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1938).
388. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Two Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Press Conference, in 4
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 312, 313 (Samuel I. Rosenman
ed., 1938).
389. Id.
390. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Urges Legislation to Prevent Tax Evasion, in
1937 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 238 (Samuel I. Rosenman
ed., 1941).
391. Id.
392. Id. at 239–45 (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.).
393. Id. at 244; see also Randolph E. Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5
U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 71–77, 84–85 (1937) (discussing family tax avoidance techniques in the
context of the 1937 bill).
394. Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion
and Avoidance, 75th Cong. 310 (1937) (statement of Roswell Magill, Undersecretary of the
Treasury).
395. Id.; see also id. at 17–21, 33–34. The plan was similar to the one that Treasury had
recommended in 1933 and 1934. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, pt. 1, at 3, 43–44, 113 (1934).
The pro-rata allocation between husband and wife was designed to overcome due process
concerns raised in Hoeper pertaining to taxing one spouse on the income of another.
396. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1546 (1937).
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community property spouses.397 It quantified the number of separate returns,398 the
lost revenue associated with separate filing,399 and which families it benefited.400
Treasury also evaluated “the complexity of the marital relationship”401 and
fundamental questions such as “how marital status should affect tax liability,”402
how to treat economies of scale in households of varying size,403 and how to
account for imputed income of stay-at-home spouses404 as well as additional

397. See, e.g., Carl Shoup, Suggestions for Study of Taxation of Community Property, 1–
2 (Sept. 19, 1939) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR)
Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/39.5) (urging a coherent approach that viewed the “community
property problem” alongside “the general treatment of married versus single taxpayers”).
398. See, e.g., Miss Coyle, supra note 35, at Table 1 (finding that the number of separate
returns jumped nearly 60% between 1935 and 1939); Martin Atlas, Separate and Joint
Returns of Husbands and Wives: Comparison of Tax Under Present Law and Treasury
Proposal (Apr. 16, 1941) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.3); Miss Coyle and Staff, Present Distribution of
Separate Returns of Husbands and Wives Classified by Size of Their Combined Net Incomes,
1936 (June 7, 1941) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR)
Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.12).
399. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1942: Hearing on H.R. 7378 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
77th Cong. 8–9 (1942) (statement of Henry Morgenthau) (separate returns costing $400
million annually); Mr. Haas to Mr. Blough (Nov. 13, 1941), cited in Miss Coyle, supra note
35 (citing another source) (reporting separate returns costing $353 million annually).
400. See, e.g., TREASURY DEP’T, THE TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME (1947), in
Revenue Revisions, 1947–48: Hearings Before the H. Comm. Ways and Means, 80th Cong.
859 (1947); Mr. Fefferman, Comments on Mr. Turner’s Memorandum Regarding a Plan to
Allow Husbands and Wives in All States the Option of Equal Division of Income for Tax
Purposes, 5 (Dec. 6, 1946) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/46.7); Mr. Turner to Dr. Atkeson, Analysis of
Effects on Tax Revenue and Individual Burdens on Equalizing Tax Treatment of Community
and Noncommunity Income, 2–6 (July 13, 1946) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of
Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/46.7); Anita Wells, Difference in
Federal Income Tax on Incomes of Specified Size in Community Property and NonCommunity Property States, 1935–1944 (Aug. 14, 1943) (on file in Office of Tax
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/43.4).
401. Roy Blough to Mr. Hanes, Comment on Mr. Wood’s “Alternative Plan for
Eliminating Inequalities in Income Tax on Married Couples,” 5 (Sept. 27, 1938) (on file in
Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/37.3).
402. Roy Blakey, “Federal Income Tax, Section VII: Joint Versus Separate Returns,” in
The Federal Revenue System: Forward and Summary of Recommendations (Sept. 20, 1934)
(on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 62),
available at http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23735/237351.htm.
403. See, e.g., Roy Blough & Carl Shoup, “Chapter 3: Income Taxation, 3. Joint vs.
Separate Returns,” in Roy Blough & Carl Shoup, A Report on the Federal Revenue System
Submitted to Undersecretary of the Treasury Roswell Magill (Sept. 20, 1937) (on file in
Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 63), available at
http://products.tax.org/civsite/Documents/Surveys/b&s_1937/CH1.HTM.
404. See, e.g., id.; Roy Blough to Mr. Sullivan, Compulsory Joint Returns, 1 (June 10,
1941) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54,
Folder GA-5/41.9).
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expenses of two-earner families.405 Further, it attempted to measure income sharing
and power relationships within families,406 and it monitored changes in community
property laws across the country,407 particularly once common law states began
converting to community property for the tax savings.408 Treasury’s comprehensive
approach accounted for economic, legal, and philosophical considerations. As
important, it was aided by a stable of talent that included Roy Blough,409 Milton
Friedman,410 Roswell Magill,411 Herman Oliphant,412 Randolph Paul,413 Carl
Shoup,414 Stanley Surrey,415 William Vickrey,416 and Jacob Viner.417
By the mid-1940s, opinion among Treasury’s experts was unanimous: use of the
individual as the tax unit produced multiple inequities when applied to the
family.418 Taxing the family as an entity could equalize taxes among similarly

405. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 399, at 31–32 (statement of Randolph
Paul) (proposing working wife tax credit); Richard Slitor, Special Income Tax Allowance for
Earnings of Wife or Head of Family (Nov. 10, 1943) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div.
of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/43.10) (same).
406. See TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 400, at 859 (noting data indicated spouses
consumed family income “for the joint benefit of both spouses”); Mr. Fefferman, Issues
Involved in the Income-Splitting Plan, 1 (Feb. 18, 1947) (on file in Office of Tax
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/46.7) (examining
sharing and consumption patterns within families); Roy Blough to Mr. Hanes, supra note
401 (concluding it was impossible to learn the “actual truth” of these relationships).
407. See, e.g., Anita Wells, Community Property, 12 (July 24, 1941) (on file in Office of
Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.23); Ellis W.
Manning, Oklahoma Community Property Law of 1939, 4 (1940) (on file in Office of Tax
Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/41.23); Anita Wells
to Roy Blough (Nov. 6, 1939) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/39.6) (discussing Oklahoma optional community
property law).
408. See McMahon, supra note 24 (discussing states’ efforts to reduce federal taxes on
their residents); infra notes 447–50 and accompanying text.
409. Economist, University of Chicago, Columbia University; Member, Council of
Economic Advisors; Assistant Secretary and Director, Division of Tax Research, Treasury.
410. Economist, University of Chicago; Nobel Laureate.
411. Law professor, Columbia University; Chief Attorney, Assistant Secretary, and
Undersecretary, Treasury.
412. Law professor, University of Chicago, Columbia University; General Counsel,
Treasury.
413. General Counsel, Treasury; Director, New York Federal Reserve Bank; Founder,
Paul Weiss LLP.
414. Economist and lawyer, University of Chicago; Led multiple tax missions on behalf
of U.S. government after World War II; Credited with inventing concept of value-added
taxation.
415. Law professor, Harvard University; Assistant Secretary and Tax Legislative
Counsel, Treasury; Pioneered concept of tax expenditure budget.
416. Economist, Columbia University; Nobel Laureate.
417. Economist, University of Chicago; Special Advisor, Treasury; Early proponent of
monetarism.
418. See, e.g., TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 400, at 849, 851–52 (stating individual tax
unit produced “substantial tax differences between families with equal incomes”).
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situated families, prevent income shifting among family members, and raise federal
revenues. It also enjoyed “the basic merit of recognizing the family as a single unit
in its financial affairs, consistently with its unity in other respects and with
governmental policy in other fields,”419 including “relief, subsidized housing and
minimum wage determination.”420 For “the bulk” of Americans, “the family is a
communal organization which serves as the unit for income receipt, for spending, []
for measuring sacrifice,” and for determining ability to pay taxes.421
Treasury’s thinking coincided with a growing consensus among experts, courts, and
Congress. Current law allowed families to create “an unreal number of economic
units”422 that achieved “multiplication of the taxpayer’s personality.”423 Families acted in
“every other vital economic and social respect . . . on a consolidated basis,” but not under
the tax law.424 Income shifting devices and community property, Randolph Paul said,
obscured the unity of the family to make it appear “as if there were no such economic
unit.”425 Family tax avoidance not only reduced revenues, but backlogged courts. “Our
tax machinery is too heavily strained to stand this increasing load of litigation,” Stanley
Surrey warned.426 “The law should be changed to require husbands and wives and minor
children living together to file a composite return.”427 Treating families as a unit could
“eliminate the greater part of questionable current avoidance, and would remove the
unjustified tax differential between citizens of community property states and those of
other states.”428
The Supreme Court had already begun recognizing the family as a taxable unit.
In Wells, the Court emphasized the “solidarity of the family,”429 while in Clifford it
found a “temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family group.”430 In
Hormel v. Helvering,431 the Court handed down a “startling broadening of the
family solidarity concept” by effectively finding that trustee-wives could never act
independently of co-trustee-husbands.432 The Court also validated the unity of the
family with respect to loss deductions from sales of property between family
members,433 aggregated charitable deductions,434 and different exemption levels for

419. Miss Coyle, supra note 35; see also WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION 74–75 (1947) (arguing families made consumption expenditures “for the joint
benefit of all members of the family”).
420. Roy Blough to Mr. Sullivan, supra note 404, at 1.
421. Id.
422. Pavenstedt, supra note 368, at 216.
423. Paul, supra note 393, at 48.
424. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 264.
425. Paul, supra note 393, at 48–49.
426. Stanley S. Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24 TAXES 980, 982 (1946).
427. Harry J. Rudick, The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance, 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 264 (1940).
428. Id.
429. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677 (1933).
430. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940).
431. 312 U.S. 552 (1941).
432. Pavenstedt, supra note 368, at 220 (writing that the Court considered “one spouse
the alter ego of the other” (emphasis in original)).
433. See Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189 (1940) (prohibiting such sales).
434. See Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195 (1940) (permitting such deductions).
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single and married taxpayers.435 These and other decisions prompted observers to
predict that the Court would uphold a tax statute treating the family as a unit.436
Congress appeared willing to consider such a statute. It noted the Court’s
receptivity to taxing the family as a unit,437 and it debated alternatives to taxing
families on total rather than individual income.438 A number of tax statutes already
treated the family as an economic unit, including the option to file joint returns,
personal exemptions for married taxpayers, the disallowance of loss deductions
from sales of property between family members, and the treatment of family
members as one person for purposes of personal holding companies. But what
would a generalized statute look like that treated all families as single economic
units? Management and control plans discriminated against community property
spouses by failing to address income-shifting arrangements among common law
spouses, and Congress had already rejected the plan three times. Mandatory joint
returns had fared as poorly. And although concerns over the plan’s constitutionality
had ebbed, the prevailing wisdom was that “you can not [sic] get the votes to make
a law out of it.”439
Enter the split-income plan. As early as 1937, the Treasury Department
considered remedying longstanding family tax problems by moving “in the
direction of the community property states, not away from them.”440 The idea of
universalizing community property for tax purposes floated around Congress in the
early 1940s,441 and tax experts analyzed the concept.442 Extending community

435. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
436. See, e.g., Roswell Magill, The Federal Income Tax on the Family, 20 TEX. L. REV.
150, 164 (1941) (calling constitutionality of taxing the family as a unit “reasonably clear”);
George E. Ray, Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property: Income
Tax, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 432 (1942) (expressing “little doubt as to the constitutionality of
a statutory provision taxing the income of a family as a unit”); Surrey, The Supreme Court,
supra note 363, at 814 (concluding that the “Court will not place a constitutional barrier” to
taxing the family as a unit).
437. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-1040, at 10, 17–22 (1941) (noting Court decisions
“conclusively demonstrate that the convenient phrase, ‘A may not be taxed on B’s’ income,
is by no means an all-pervasive formula which will assist in the solution of tax problems”).
438. See Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 399 (mandatory joint return with pro-rata
liability); Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 77th
Cong. (1942) (same); H.R. Rep. No. 77-1040, supra note 437 (same); see also S. Rep. No.
77-673 (1941) (hybrid joint return plan with earned income taxable to the earner and
unearned income taxable to the spouse with management and control).
439. Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 4790 Before S. Comm. on
Fin., 80th Cong. 272 (1948) (statement of Sen. Eugene Millikin).
440. Blough & Shoup, supra note 403.
441. See Revenue Act of 1942, supra note 399, at 32–33 (statement of Sen. Robert Taft)
(“It seems to me, if you want to eliminate [tax disparities between families] the thing to do is
to go back to the individual basis and let the families divide their income between husband
and wife equally, as they do in community-property States.”).
442. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 427 (1940)
(querying whether it was “feasible to extend to all of the country the tax benefits of the
community system”); George T. Altman, Community Property: Avoiding Avoidance by
Adoption in the Revenue Act, 16 TAXES 138, 141 (1938) (arguing for taxing similarly
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property nationwide even made its way into the public discourse.443 Common law
states sought tax savings for their married residents without adopting community
property laws. In 1947, ten states444 petitioned Congress for a law universalizing
community property for purposes of filing federal income taxes, and individual
legislators introduced twenty bills providing income-splitting privileges to spouses
nationwide.445 Public opinion polls reflected the widespread support, with 74% of
respondents answering “yes” to the Gallup poll question: “For the purpose of
income taxes in nine States a man and wife can divide their income equally
between themselves to reduce their income tax. Should married couples in the other
39 States be allowed to do the same thing?”446
By 1948, five states and one territory decided they could wait no longer for
Congress to intervene.447 They took the drastic step of converting from
longstanding common law regimes to community property law, while twelve more
states considered similar measures.448 The Treasury urged Congress to enact a
national plan before additional states made the awkward conversion to community
property, a process that created “considerable confusion and dislocation of property
interests in the various States.”449 With “so many States shifting” and with others
prepared to do the same, Treasury official Stanley Surrey argued that it was “proper
for the Federal Government to act” with a split income plan.450
Other historical factors converged to move the idea of income splitting to the top
of the policy agenda. In the immediate postwar period Congress sought tax cuts,
both as a peace dividend and as a way to stimulate the economy. Experts, too,
believed that tax cuts could ease the economy’s transition from wartime to
peacetime, and provide the necessary stimulus to private investment.451 Income
situated families equally by “extending to all the benefits now limited to the few”).
443. See Jones, supra note 359, at 266–74; McMahon, supra note 24.
444. Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin.
445. See Anita Wells, Community Property States (Sept. 1, 1947) (on file in Office of
Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research (OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/47.15).
446. Individual Income Tax Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1 Before S. Comm. on Fin., 80th
Cong. 551 (1947) (statement of Sen. William Fulbright).
447. Hawaii (1945), Michigan (1947), Nebraska (1947), Oklahoma (1939), Oregon
(1943), and Pennsylvania (1947). See McMahon, supra note 24 (discussing states’ efforts to
reduce federal taxes on their residents).
448. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Some common law
residents sought tax savings by migrating to neighboring community property states. For the
tax-induced exodus from common law to community property states, see 93 CONG. REC.
5837–40 (statements of Sen. John McClellan, Sen. William Knowland, Sen. Kenneth
Wherry, Sen. William Fulbright).
449. Individual Income Tax Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1, supra note 446, at 488
(statement of Stanley Surrey, Tax Legislative Council, Treasury Department).
450. Id. at 489; see also Erwin N. Griswold, Defense Emphasizes Our Need for Sound
Tax System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1941, at E8 (arguing forcing common law states to adopt
community property was “highly undesirable in view of complexity of that regime”).
451. See, e.g., HAROLD M. GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS
(1946); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY (1947); Carl Shoup, Three Plans for
Post-War Taxation, 34 AM. ECON. REV. 757 (1944); Clark Warburton, A Suggestion for
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splitting accomplished the desired tax reduction without protracted and
acrimonious debate over adjustments to tax rates and brackets.
After sweeping to victory in the 1946 mid-term elections, Republicans wasted
little time in passing two tax reduction bills. President Truman vetoed them both on
the grounds that they offered “the wrong kind of tax reduction, at the wrong
time.”452 The Republican leadership repackaged tax cuts a third time in a “vetoproof” bill that provided something for everyone.453 It increased personal and
dependent exemptions,454 a move that appealed to Democrats, and it lowered tax
rates across the board,455 a move supported by Republicans. The bill also permitted
spouses nationwide to split marital income and property for purposes of filing
federal income taxes,456 a provision that amounted to an additional tax cut for
married, common law taxpayers. It even included something for community
property residents: repeal of the 1942 amendments to the federal estate and gift
taxes that had raised transfer taxes on community property spouses.457
Truman opposed the bill, but there was little he could do to prevent its
enactment. The split-income plan accomplished “simplicity of taxpayer
compliance, ease of administration, and minimum of disruptive change in the local
laws of States.”458 It prescribed the soothing pill of “tax-reduction and taxequalization.”459 It did not “do violence to [the] fundamental property laws” of
states, nor raise constitutional concerns.460 It produced tax uniformity among
married couples, discouraged income-shifting schemes, and minimized litigation
over tax-saving devices. It stanched the “impetuous enactment” of community
property law, moreover.461 And it promised tax saving for all married couples,462 a

Post-War Taxes, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 882 (1946).
452. H.R. DOC. NO. 80-322, at 1 (1947).
453. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 482 (1954).
454. H.R. 4970, 80th Cong. § 201 (1948).
455. Id. §§ 101, 401.
456. Id. § 301.
457. Id. § 351; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1013 (Supplementary Report) (1948). The 1942
amendments ignored shared individual ownership interests of spouses under community
property law, and taxed the predeceasing spouse as full owner of the marital property in
addition to the surviving spouse on her share at death. With respect to the gift tax, the law
treated community property spouses as a single entity such that they received one gift tax
exemption while common law spouses received two.
458. Division of Tax Research Staff, Major Issues in Drafting the 50-50 Family Income
Splitting Proposal, 2 (Oct. 2, 1947) (on file in Office of Tax Analysis/Div. of Tax Research
(OTA/DTR) Files, Box 54, Folder GA-5/47.10).
459. H.R. REP. NO. 80-1274, at 3 (1948).
460. Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearing on H.R. 4790, supra note 439, at
305 (statement of Allan H. W. Higgins, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association).
461. S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 25 (1948).
462. In 1948, the tax benefits associated with income splitting accrued disproportionately
to a small cohort of wealthy taxpayers. See Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearing
on H.R. 4790, supra note 439, at 24 (statement of John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury)
(reporting 97.5% of income-splitting benefits went to less than 4% of taxpayers). Rising
incomes and the declining value of tax-free thresholds in the postwar period meant that an
increasing number of spouses would realize income-splitting benefits over the next several
decades.
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group that comprised 80% of all households.463 Common law spouses benefited
from dividing marital income equally, while community property spouses benefited
from dividing income from separate property, a source of income which was not
co-owned under community property law.
In the end, the income-splitting plan, along with the rest of the Revenue Act of
1948,464 sailed through Congress, easily overcoming Truman’s third veto of tax
legislation in less than a year.465 Tax reformers heralded income splitting as a
victory. Basking in its enactment, Harvard law professor and former Treasury
official Stanley Surrey observed with satisfaction that the provision “adds a
chapter” to “the long history of the treatment of family income” that was “likely to
be the last for many years.”466 Moreover, it reflected the principle “that
achievement of tax equity among married couples requires an income tax based
upon a nationwide uniform plan that disregards, as between husband and wife, the
legal allocation of their income or the legal ownership of the property producing
the income.”467
With the enactment of income splitting, ownership as the lodestar of family
taxation had been supplanted by a legal fiction. Or had it?
CONCLUSION: SEABORN, INCOME SPLITTING, AND TAXING MODERN FAMILIES
In 1935, tax lawyers Randolph Paul and Valentine Havens argued that treating
husbands and wives as single tax units could solve the problems associated with
ascertaining family tax liability under an ownership rule. “There would be no need
to resort to ownership as a test of tax incidence if the husband and wife were a tax
unit, or ‘unified welded entity.’”468 Paul and Havens were right that treating
spouses under the federal income tax as a single unit rather than two distinct units
with “legal separateness”469 would shift the focus from the individual to the family.
But it would not eliminate ownership “as a test of tax incidence.” At best, it
replaced an ownership rule concerned with individual interests with another
ownership rule concerned with combined interests. Aggregating a family’s income
and property to determine its tax liability still required examining ownership
interests of individual family members under state property law. Specifically, it still
required determining what income and property individual members owed such
that it could be aggregated, split in two, and taxed as two equal halves.
The income-splitting provision enacted in 1948 was even less of a threat to the
ownership principle than the concept of treating families as single economic units.
It was “simply a method of calculating the Federal income tax on a husband and

463. KAREN ANDERSON, WARTIME WOMEN: SEX ROLES, FAMILY RELATIONS, AND THE
STATUS OF WOMEN DURING WORLD WAR II 5 (1981).
464. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110.
465. H.R. DOC. NO. 80-589, at 2 (1948).
466. Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family—The Revenue Act of 1948, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1104 (1948).
467. Id. at 1114.
468. Paul & Havens, supra note 242, at 245 (quoting Brownsville Coal & Coke Co. v.
Heiner, 38 F.2d 248, 251 (W.D. Pa. 1930)).
469. Id.
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wife who file a joint return,” Stanley Surrey told Congress in 1947.470 It was an
administrative convenience, a device to extend postwar tax cuts and to discourage
families from undertaking costly income-shifting behavior. As the Senate explained
in its own description of the provision, it merely allowed husbands and wives the
“opportunity” to “file joint returns, divide their net income and exemptions by two,
compute their tax on this basis, and multiply the result by two.”471
Income splitting did not challenge Seaborn’s holding that the federal income tax
was a levy “upon the net income of every individual” and that “the word ‘of’
denotes ownership.”472 Nor did it alter prevailing internal revenue laws requiring
that the federal income tax be “levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year
upon the net income of every individual.”473 And it certainly did not stop federal
and state courts from invoking Seaborn nearly 100 times for the “ownership equals
taxability” principle.474 Owners of income and property within families were still
subject to federal income taxation, and ownership was still determined by the
interests of individual family members under applicable state law.475
Eighty years after Seaborn and sixty years after introduction of the incomesplitting provision, the “ownership equals taxability” principle still resonates. Not
only is Seaborn good law,476 it remains the lodestar of family taxation. It tells us
that family tax liability under both the federal income tax and federal estate tax
follows ownership, not marriage. In 2011 as in 1930, Seaborn requires ascertaining
property interests as determined by state law rather than locating the presence or
absence of a marriage license. Members of state-recognized familial relationships
in 2011 may look different or more heterogeneous than members of staterecognized familial relationships in 1930, but ownership of income and property
under state property law rather than the existence of a marital contract dictates
family tax liability.
In 2010, the IRS acknowledged this reality by applying the “ownership equals
taxability” principle to registered domestic partners in California, both same-sex
and opposite-sex RDPs.477 “Applying the principle that federal law respects state
law property characterizations,” the IRS Chief Counsel opined, “the federal tax
treatment of community property should apply to California registered domestic
partners.”478 Subsequently, the government extended its holding to domestic

470. Individual Income Tax Reduction: Hearing on H.R. 1, supra note 446, at 490
(statement of Stanley Surrey, Tax Legislative Council, Treasury Department).
471. S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 4 (1948).
472. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 109 (1930).
473. 26 U.S.C. § 11 (1946). Current law reflects the same focus on individual ownership,
even for married taxpayers. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)–(d) (2006) (the federal income tax reaches
the “taxable income” of “every married individual . . . who makes a single return jointly with
his spouse”; of “every head of a household”; of “every individual . . . who is not a married
individual”; and of “every married individual” who does not file jointly).
474. Cases on file with author.
475. See also McMahon, supra note 24.
476. See supra note 3 (recent cases citing Seaborn favorably).
477. California permits opposite-sex couples to register as domestic partners so long as
one or both persons are over the age of 62. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5)(B) (2010).
478. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050, supra note 11, at 2.
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partners in Nevada and Washington, both of which grant full community property
rights to RDPs.479 Thus, even though the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
prohibits these couples from filing federal income taxes as spouses480 (the filing
status with the most favorable rates), they can now take advantage of tax savings
associated with income splitting. For example, as a result of the 2010 ruling, a
domestic partnership in California with one partner earning $100,000 and the other
earning $30,000 would now report two incomes of $65,000 when filing federal
income taxes, resulting in tax savings of $942.481
There is much to praise in the 2010 guidance, not least of which is the explicit
application of the “ownership equals taxability” principle to nontraditional families.
But the ruling leaves much to be desired.
First, it has no precedential value. Neither the Chief Counsel Advisory482 nor the
private letter ruling483 on which it was based may be used or cited as precedent.484
The letter ruling applies exclusively to the specific taxpayer who requested the
ruling and solely to the questions posed in the original request. Similarly, the CCA
only analyzes the unique facts and circumstances posed in the ruling request
without covering relevant questions pertaining to the application of federal taxation
to state law.
In its 2010 Annual Report to Congress, the IRS National Taxpayer Advocate
highlighted some of these unresolved issues, identifying them among the “Most
Serious Problems” facing taxpayers.485 Federal tax law contains provisions

479. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
480. See supra note 25.
481. Calculated from tables for 2010 tax year. See Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 1.
Without income splitting, the couple would pay $25,692 in federal income tax compared to
$24,750. Tax savings for domestic partners in the three affected states will vary based on the
income ratio between partners. Generally, greater savings will accrue to partners with more
unequal ratios, because shifting higher percentages of total income moves the family further
down the rate scale (in other words, the tax on one $100,000 income will be lower than the
tax on two $50,000 incomes).
482. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050, supra note 11.
483. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201021048 (May 5, 2010).
484. 26 U.S.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2006).
485. 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 211–20 (2010). For news coverage of these issues and the confusion
they create for same-sex couples, including the approximately 60,000 legally partnered
same-sex couples in California (comprising approximately 18,000 same-sex marriages and
58,000 RDPs, two overlapping categories), see Scott James, For Same-Sex Couples, a Tax
Victory That Doesn’t Feel Like One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011, at A21; see also Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (preserving the 18,000 same-sex marriages performed in
California between June and November 2008); Laura Meckler, Gay Couples Get Equal Tax
Treatment, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (June 5, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704080104575286931017169308.html (58,000 California RDPs). A
significant percentage of these couples are legally recognized as both RDPs and spouses
under state law; that is, they are registered as domestic partners with the California Secretary
of State, and they also obtained valid marriages between June 16, 2008 and November 5,
2008 before Proposition 8 denied that right under the state constitution. See CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay

2011]

SAVING SEABORN

1521

pertaining to childcare, health care, education, and welfare that require taxpayers to
meet certain qualifying definitions. Defining “child” under the federal income tax,
for instance, determines eligibility for head of household filing status486 and the
dependency deduction,487 in addition to the child-care credit,488 child tax credit,489
and earned income tax credit.490 But it is unclear which partner in a domestic
partnership or civil union or same-sex marriage may be entitled to claim these tax
benefits on her tax return, particularly if the qualifying child was the stepchild of
one partner by virtue of the domestic partnership or civil union or marriage. Federal
tax law does not define “child” in relation to marriage, and DOMA provides no
definition. But if DOMA disregards the legal existence of these families, it is
unclear which of the two partners—both of whom are considered the child’s parent
under state law—can qualify the child for federal tax purposes.491 Such
characterization is significant for allocating these child-related subsidies in the
most tax advantageous way, all of which require positive taxable income as a
condition of receipt and some of which phase out at higher income levels.
A similar problem occurs when trying to qualify eligible “dependents” under the
tax law’s education provisions. These include tax dispensations for a dependent’s
college tuition and student loan interest as well as the Lifetime Learning Credit,
Hope Scholarship Credit, American Opportunity Tax Credit, and other deductions
and exclusions related to education.492 As the National Taxpayer Advocate asked in
its 2010 annual report, “Is a domestic partner or same gender spouse in a
community property state deemed to provide, for dependency purposes, the support
that he or she earns?”493 More specifically, “will dependency status be determined
on the basis of individual earnings or only after allocating all community income
equally between the partners?”494 The same questions arise for tax provisions
related to medical care expenses of dependents.495
granted, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
486. 26 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2006).
487. See id. §§ 151–52 (2006 & Supp. II 2009).
488. See id. § 21.
489. See id. § 24.
490. See id. § 32.
491. For discussion of DOMA’s impact on the federal tax treatment of same-sex couples,
see Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481
(2009); Anthony C. Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 319 (2010);
William P. Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Is Bad Income Tax Policy, 35 U.
MEM. L. REV. 399 (2005).
492. See 26 U.S.C. § 222 (Qualified tuition and related expenses); id. § 135 (Income
from U.S. savings bonds used to pay higher education tuition and fees); id. § 221 (Interest on
education loans); id. § 25A (Hope and Lifetime Learning credits).
493. 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 485, at 215.
494. Patricia Cain, National Taxpayer Advocate Reports That Tax Law Creates Serious
Problem for Same-Sex Couples, SAME SEX TAX LAW BLOG (Jan. 15, 2011, 4:03 PM),
http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/national-taxpayer-advocate-reports-that-tax-law-createsserious-problem-for-same-sex-couples.cfm.
495. These provisions include, among others, the exclusion for certain employer
reimbursements, 26 U.S.C. § 105, the deduction for extraordinary medical and dental
expenses, id. § 213, Flexible Spending Accounts, id. § 125, Archer Medical Savings
Accounts, id. § 220, and Health Savings Accounts, id. § 223. Additional issues discussed in
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Congress enacted all of these provisions—whether related to childcare, health
care, education, or general welfare—to help families with children. Yet it is
unclear, particularly in light of DOMA, whether members of same-sex marriages,
domestic partners, civil unions and all related children enjoy access to the same
economic and educational support enjoyed by all other taxpayers. In the meantime,
hundreds of thousands of same-sex couples take positions on their tax returns every
year in an environment of significant legal uncertainty.496
Besides lacking precedential value and failing to answer myriad questions, the
2010 ruling applies exclusively to domestic partners in three community property
states. It mandates that RDPs in California, Nevada, and Washington “must report
one-half of the community income . . . on his or her federal income tax return.”497
But what about the hundreds of thousands of other same-sex couples in legally
recognized relationships throughout the country, particularly those living in states
that extend property rights to these nontraditional families?
This Article lays the foundation for a broader application of the “ownership
equals taxability” principle. Its contents demonstrate that same-sex couples in legal
relationships recognized under the law of any community property state are entitled
to the same federal income tax treatment as afforded RDPs in California, Nevada,
and Washington. This includes Wisconsin, which already has a relatively robust
domestic partnership law (though it currently does not extend application of marital
property law to domestic partners),498 New Mexico, which appears to be on the
brink of enacting domestic partnership legislation,499 and any of the remaining four
community property states (Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Texas) that in the future
may recognize same-sex couples and subject them to the state’s community
property regime. It would also include same-sex spouses in California, whether
married before or after Proposition 8 and whether their marriage licenses were
the National Taxpayer Advocate’s report include the treatment of alimony and property
settlements upon divorce, whether the creation of community property should be treated as a
taxable transfer for same-sex couples, and whether same-sex tenants by the entirety have a
qualified joint interest for estate tax purposes. See 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra
note 485, at 215–17.
496. Given this legal uncertainty, which was heightened by the government’s 2010 ruling
pertaining to RDPs in California, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation
authorized its Teaching Tax Committee to examine community property issues related to
RDPs. Upon completion of its study, the ABA Community Property Comment Project will
submit comments to the IRS. See Nicole Duarte, ABA Forms Group to Examine Domestic
Partner Community Property Questions, 127 TAX NOTES 1435 (2010). In the interest of full
disclosure, I serve as a member of this task force.
497. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201021050, supra note 11, at 2.
498. See WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001–.018 (West 2010) (providing various legal protections in
areas including insurance, decisions about medical treatment and health care, retirement,
death benefits and probate, but not encompassing some aspects of marriage, including,
among other things, marital property law).
499. Although domestic partnership legislation failed to pass the New Mexico legislature
in both 2010 and 2009, it enjoys the strong support of Gov. Bill Richardson. Its key sponsor,
Sen. Peter Wirth (D-Santa Fe), has predicted, “It’s gonna happen, it’s just a matter of when.”
Larry Behrens, Domestic Partnerships Done for 2010, But Will Be Back, Supporters Say,
N.M INDEP. (Feb. 15, 2010, 7:52 P.M.), http://newmexicoindependent.com/47693/domesticpartnerships-done-for-2010-but-will-be-back-supporters-say.
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issued by California or other jurisdictions. Same-sex couples with California
marriage licenses (only issued between June 16, 2008 and November 5, 2008)
remain subject to the state’s community property regime, because the California
Supreme Court held that all same-sex couples married in California before the
effective date of Proposition 8 are still legally married.500 Moreover, by virtue of
SB 54, signed into law by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in late 2009, same-sex
couples with marriage licenses issued outside California either before or after
Proposition 8 are entitled to full recognition as married couples and fully subject to
the state’s community property statute.501
In addition to providing the basis for extending “ownership equals taxability” to
same-sex couples in all community property states (not just California, Nevada, and
Washington), this Article foreshadows an even more expansive application of the
principle to common law states. Currently, a number of common law states
recognize familial relationships other than traditional spouses, including same-sex
marriages,502 civil unions,503 domestic partnerships,504 and reciprocal beneficiary
relationships.505 In addition to the six jurisdictions that authorize same-sex
marriage, New Jersey (civil union), Oregon (domestic partnership), and the District
of Columbia (domestic partnership) confer comprehensive legal status on same-sex
couples substantially similar to marriage. The other jurisdictions recognizing samesex relationships transfer less comprehensive legal status with more limited rights.
Regardless of specific allocation of rights, to the extent these common law
jurisdictions determine ownership of income and property for same-sex couples by
virtue of general property law, Seaborn’s “ownership equals taxability” principle

500. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (preserving the 18,000 same-sex
marriages performed in California).
501. See Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights & Equal. Cal., SB 54 and Same-Sex Couples Who
Marry Outside California (Oct. 20, 2009), available at www.nclrights.org/site/
DocServer/SB_54_FAQ.pdf?docID=6641. In the United States, jurisdictions granting
marriage licenses to same-sex couples include Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Vermont and the District of Columbia. International jurisdictions include
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and
The Netherlands. See Dan Fastenberg, International Gay Marriage, TIME (July 22, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2005678,00.html.
502. Common law states recognizing same-sex marriages include Connecticut, Iowa,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the District of Columbia. Three additional
states (Maryland, New York, Rhode Island) recognize same-sex marriages from these six
jurisdictions.
503. New Jersey is the only state that currently recognizes civil unions, while Illinois will
begin authorizing civil unions in June 2011. See Ray Long & Monique Garcia, Illinois
Senate OKs Civil Unions, Historic Legislation Goes to Quinn, Who Supports It, CHI. TRIB.
(Dec. 1, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-12-01/news/ct-met-civil-unionssenate-20101201_1_civil-unions-gay-child-vote. In Connecticut, New Hampshire, and
Vermont, civil unions were replaced by same-sex marriage.
504. Common law jurisdictions recognizing domestic partnerships include Colorado,
Maine, Maryland, Oregon, and the District of Columbia.
505. Hawaii is the only state that recognizes reciprocal beneficiary relationships, which
under current law extends limited rights to beneficiaries.
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should apply.506 It is true that most common law jurisdictions currently follow a
strict title theory of ownership during the lifetime of the marriage (emphasizing
separate rather than shared interests), such that Seaborn cannot accomplish income
splitting as readily as it does in community property states. But for those common
law states that apply less rigid title theories of ownership under their marital
property law, or whose property law reflects some aspects of community property
principles, Seaborn’s “ownership equals taxability” rule could accomplish at least
some degree of income splitting for same-sex couples.507
While Seaborn may have only partial application in common law jurisdictions,
it can achieve uniform and comprehensive reform in all nine community property
states, not just in California, Nevada, and Washington. To the extent the remaining
six community property states desire extending comprehensive legal status to
same-sex couples at some point in the future (while also securing valuable incomesplitting privileges on par with same-sex residents in California, Nevada, and
Washington), I offer three suggestions, two based on this Article’s findings and a
third based on current political and economic realities.
First, the chosen policy (whether marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership)
should automatically rather than voluntarily subject same-sex couples to a state’s
community property regime. In Commissioner v. Harmon,508 the U.S. Supreme
Court invalidated Oklahoma’s elective community property law, which, “even
though authorized by state law and irrevocable in character,” did not transfer
necessary ownership interests for purposes of allowing couples to split their income
under the federal income tax.509 The optional Oklahoma statute looked and

506. As this Article has demonstrated, federal courts view domestic relations law as the
province of the states. As recently as 2004, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its deference,
stating,
One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined to
intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we observed that ‘[t]he
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.’
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890)); see also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989)
(“[D]omestic relations are preeminently matters of state law.”); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.”). Also as this
Article has shown, federal courts respect income splitting between members of staterecognized families by operation of general property law, but not by private contract. And,
as Seaborn itself held, ownership of income and property determines tax liability, and state
property law determines ownership of family income and property.
507. Examining this claim in a comprehensive and meaningful way requires an entirely
separate article.
508. 323 U.S. 44, 46 (1944) (invalidating Oklahoma’s optional community property law
as creating a “consensual” rather than a “legal” community).
509. Id. According to the leading scholar on the subject, “the allure of the community
property regime [in Oklahoma] had been intimately linked to its tax savings,” a fact not
overlooked by the Court as it sought to determine whether the Oklahoma statute sufficiently
altered incidents of ownership or inappropriately authorized tax savings for state residents.
McMahon, supra note 24, at 622. For a wonderful discussion of Oklahoma’s optional
community property law and the Harmon decision, see id. at 592–611.
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operated more like a private law contract than a general law property statute, the
latter of which vested by operation of law rather than by discretion of the parties.
By comparison, RDPs in California (and Nevada and Washington) “are
mandatorily subject to the community property regime. For them, community
property is part of a single system and not an option they can elect or reject while
retaining the rest of the rights and obligations of the system.”510 Consequently, the
community property regime in these states can be said to transfer sufficient
ownership interests, allowing domestic partners to split their combined income.
Second, the chosen policy should provide immediate, vested, and equal rights in
all income and property to same-sex couples in the same way it does to oppositesex spouses. For the “ownership equals taxability” rule to attach, state law must
require that income is shared the moment it arises (and not shared, for instance, by
virtue of an assignment or gift or contract), at which point Seaborn authorizes
income splitting for federal income tax purposes.
Finally, while “state domestic relations law has outpaced federal tax law,”511
there remains solid opposition to extending equal rights to same-sex couples, even
in states that currently recognize same-sex relationships.512 Advocates for staterecognized, same-sex relationships must seize every political and economic
advantage, including exploiting the findings of studies that indicate extending legal
rights to same-sex couples can generate significant revenue for states. According to
researchers, allowing same-sex marriage in New Jersey, for instance, could boost
the economy by $200 million per year, create 1,400 jobs, and net $15.1 million in
tax revenues for the state and for local governments.513 Another study found that
since 2005, the economic benefit to Massachusetts from allowing same-sex
marriage topped $100 million.514 Indeed, the positive economic impact of

510. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, supra note 21, at 846.
511. 1 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 485, at 211.
512. For the successful efforts to repeal same-sex marriage in California and Maine, both
of which have domestic partnership laws, see CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5; November 3, 2009
General Election Tabluations: People’s Veto and Referendum Questions, County and
Statewide
Totals,
ME.
BUREAU
OF
CORPS.,
ELECTIONS
&
COMM’NS,
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html.
513. See BRAD SEARS, CHRISTOPHER RAMOS & M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS INST., THE
IMPACT OF EXTENDING MARRIAGE TO SAME-SEX COUPLES ON THE NEW JERSEY BUDGET
(2009) .
514. See NAOMI G. GOLDBERG, MICHAEL D. STEINBERGER & M.V. LEE BADGETT,
WILLIAMS INST., THE BUSINESS BOOST FROM MARRIAGE EQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE
HEALTH AND MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN MASSACHUSETTS SURVEY (2009). For additional
studies pertaining to the economic impact of extending legal status to same-sex couples in
other states, see NAOMI G. GOLDBERG, R. BRADLEY SEARS & M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS
INST., POTENTIAL IMPACT OF HB444 ON STATE OF HAWAII (2009) (citing as much as $9.5
million over four years from civil union celebrations, $40.3 million in out-of-state guest
travel to civil union celebrations, $1.6 million in higher excise tax revenues $77,000 in filing
fees, $400,000 savings in public benefits programs, and 333 new jobs); CHRISTOPHER
RAMOS, M.V. LEE BADGETT & BRAD SEARS, WILLIAMS INST., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
EXTENDING MARRIAGE TO SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2009) (citing
$52.2 million in revenue over three years, $5.4 million in taxes and fees, and 700 new jobs);
CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, M.V. LEE BADGETT, MICHAEL D. STEINBERGER & BRAD SEARS,
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extending legal rights to same-sex couples could ease the severe fiscal crisis facing
every state.515 Researchers have also shown that recognizing same-sex relationships
nationwide as part of federal policy could have similarly positive economic effects
on the national budget, netting as much as $1 billion a year.516
If policy makers and reformers followed these three rules, particularly the first
two, they would help millions of non-traditional families, same-sex as well as
opposite-sex. Extending equal “rights, protections, and benefits” to non-traditional
families under state property law, and subjecting them to the same “responsibilities,
obligations, and duties . . . as are granted to and imposed upon spouses” would put
these families squarely within the four corners of Seaborn, authorizing them to split
combined income in half when filing federal income taxes.517 In so doing, Seaborn
offers these legally recognized couples an opportunity to circumvent the tax filing
restrictions and disadvantages created by DOMA. Indeed, Seaborn’s “ownership
equals taxability” rule remains the guidepost of family taxation, which for more
than eighty years has followed ownership not marriage.
***
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515. See ELIZABETH MCNICHOL, PHIL OLIFF & NICOLAS JOHNSONS, CENTER ON BUDGET
AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT (2010) (calling
current recession the worst since the 1930s with “the steepest decline in state tax receipts on
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516. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF
RECOGNIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGES (2004).
517. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2007).

